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The Regulation of Traditional Practitioners:
The Role of Law in Shaping Informal Constraints
Marcus Powlowskit
Abstract
Is the regulation of traditional practitioners a worthwhile
endeavor? There is little empirical evidence to support the use of
such regulations. Given the poor disciplinary record of
comparable regulatory bodies in developed countries and the
difficulty in enforcing laws in developing countries, it is unlikely
that such regulatory agencies will discipline many practitioners.
This does not mean that regulation cannot serve a useful purpose.
Regulation is not only about disciplining the occasional bad apple.
The regulation of health practitioners has a broader purpose that
involves correcting market imperfections, shaping norms, applying
self-imposed standards, and other informal constraints. These
informal constraints exist in all cultures, and are as important as, if
not more important than, formal rules in shaping human behavior.
Part of the function of laws regulating traditional practitioners
should be to recognize the existence of these informal mechanisms
and to encourage and mold them in a socially desirable direction.
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I. Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) encourages member
states to integrate, as appropriate, traditional and complementary
[Vol. XXXII
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and alternative medicine (CAM)' into their national healthcare
systems.2 This recommendation is evidence of the WHO's respect
for the practice of traditional medicine. In many ways, this respect
is understandable. The majorities of the populations in countries
such as China and India have been using traditional medicine for
thousands of years.3  Some traditional practices, such as
acupuncture, have gained widespread international acceptance,
even by many members of the Western medical community.4
Furthermore, the pharmacological literature is replete with
promising reports from the in vitro testing of traditional medicine.'
Given this widespread acceptance of traditional medicine, and the
1 The term complementary and alternative medicine "often refers to traditional
medicine that is practiced in a country but is not part of the country's own traditions" or
"health care that is considered to be supplementary to allopathic medicine." Allopathic
medicine (also known as "Western," "scientific," or "modern medicine") is based on
scientific principals and evidence. "Traditional medicine" is used to describe a form of
practice "within the country of origin." World Health Organization [WHO], Legal
Status of Traditional Medicine and Complementary/Alternative Medicine: A Worldwide
Review, at 1-2, WHO/EDM/TRM/2001.2 2001 [hereinafter WHO (2001)].
2 See id.; WHO, WHO Traditional Medicine Strategy 2002-2005, at 5,
WHO/EDM/TRM/2002.1 (2002) [hereinafter WHO (2002)]. However, the fifty-sixth
World Health Assembly, held in May 2003, gave only a rather tepid endorsement of the
need to integrate traditional medicine into national health care systems. WHO,
Traditional Medicine Resolution of the Executive. Board of the WHO 111th Session,
WHO Doc. EB111.R12, Jan. 24, 2003.
3 See WHO (2001), supra note 1, at 131-34, 148-52.
4 See, e.g., Edzard Ernst, Acupuncture for rheumatic conditions, Aug. 2006
www.UptoDate.com (discussing the use of acupuncture in treatment of rheumatic
conditions); R. Joshua Wootton & Zahid H. Baiwa, Nonpharmacologic therapy of
headache, Aug. 2006, www.UptoDate.com (discussing the use of acupuncture in the
treatment of headaches).
5 MEDLINE® is the United States National Library of Medicine's (NLM®)
premiere bibliographic database providing information from the field of medicine and
other health sciences [hereinafter Medline]. A Medline search reveals numerous articles
supporting this fact. See, e.g., M.H.Dashti-Rahmatabadi et al., The analgesic effect of
Carum copticum extract and morphine on phasic pain in mice, J.
ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY, (2006) (published online before print), available at
www.sciencedirect.com (search under "analgesic effect of Carum copticum extract and
morphine on phasic pain in mice"); J. Purintrapiban et al., Differential Activation of
Glucose Transport in Cultured Muscle Cells by Polyphenolic Compounds from Canna
indica L. Root, 29 BIOLOGICAL & PHARMACEUTICALS BULL. 1995 (2006); P. Siripong et
al., Induction of Apoptosis in Tumor Cells by Three Naphthoquinone Esters Isolated
from Thai Medicinal Plant: Rhinacanthus nasutus KUR, 29 BIOLOGICAL &
PHARMACEUTICALS BULL. 2070 (2006).
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fact that traditional practitioners, who are often the first ones
consulted when someone becomes ill, outnumber allopathic
practitioners in many parts of the world,6 integrating traditional
practitioners into national healthcare systems appears to be a
pragmatic approach to achieving WHO's objective of health for
all.
There is, however, a need for caution. Traditional practices
are not always beneficial, nor are they always benign.
Recognizing this, WHO encourages the regulation of traditional
medicine.7 Indeed most countries, including many poor countries,
now have legislation requiring the licensing of traditional
practitioners.8 This gives rise to a number of questions. Should
developing countries regulate the practice? Is such intervention in
the free market warranted? Are such regulations enforceable? Are
regulations an effective means of ensuring quality of care?
Unfortunately, there is scant empirical data to answer these
questions. There is a paucity of literature pertaining to the
effectiveness of medical regulations in developed countries, and
thus it is no surprise that the issue of regulating traditional
practitioners in developing countries has received almost no
attention. Nevertheless, this is an issue that is ripe for exploration.
The WHO and others advocate regulation.9 Drafting legislation is
costly and certainly there are other areas of healthcare that could
use the money.
Informal constraints exist in all cultures and undoubtedly play
some part in regulating the behavior of traditional practitioners.
The question for those considering regulation is whether existing
informal constraints are effective in supporting beneficial social
exchange. In other words, the issue is whether the informal
constraints function effectively in ensuring high-quality service.
Although the answer to this question may vary from place to
6 WHO (2001), supra note 1, at 3-4; WHO (2002), supra note 2, at 1-2.
7 WHO (2002), supra note 2, at 5; Xiaorui Zhang, Foreward to WHO (2001)
supra note 1.
8 See generally WHO (2001), supra note 1 (providing information on the
worldwide development of legal frame works regulating traditional and alternative
medicines).
9 WHO (2002), supra note 2, at 5; Xiaorui Zhang, Forward to WHO (2001),
supra note 1.
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place, there is reason to believe that in many places informal
constraints do not benefit social exchange or function effectively
in ensuring objectively high-quality service. Given the failures of
both the market and informal control mechanisms, regulation is
warranted. Having passed the hurdle of justifying regulations, the
next question is whether regulations are likely to work. At first
blush, the answer is no. The regulation of health practitioners-
particularly doctors-in developed, countries is presumably the
model for regulating traditional practitioners. There is little
evidence that such regulations have been effective in developed
countries, let alone in developing countries where adherence to the
rule of law is at best tenuous. In addition, there would be the
problem of establishing standards where such standards would be
hard, if not impossible, to quantify.
A more careful and nuanced consideration of the role of law
suggests that regulations can serve a useful function. Although
establishing standards may be difficult, the law can get around this
by prescribing what traditional practitioners cannot do (rather than
entering into the difficult task of trying to define what they can do)
and by requiring them to refer patients whom they are unable to
treat. Lastly, a consideration of the role of law in shaping informal
constraints suggests that even though it may be unrealistic to
expect regulators to do much actual prosecuting, this does not
mean that regulations are a futile endeavor. This is because the
government's desire to improve the quality of traditional services
might be realized by creating a set of rules that make a variety of
informal constraints possible.
This paper will argue that regulating traditional practitioners
may improve the quality of services such practitioners perform
and that such regulation may be a worthwhile endeavor. In setting
forth this argument, the paper is structured as follows: first,
evidence is presented in support of the proposition that there is a
problem: traditional practitioners can cause harm. Next, taking an
economic perspective, the need for regulation will be argued by
showing that unregulated markets for traditional medicine in
developing countries do not work. The following two sections
examine the role of informal and formal constraints, respectively.
The paper then turns to the role of law in shaping informal
constraints. The final section presents a brief conclusion.
2006]
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II. A Caveat About Generalizing
One has to question the validity of making generalizations
about traditional practitioners , and CAM practitioners.
Chiropractic therapy is different from massage therapy, and
African traditional medicine is different from Chinese traditional
medicine. The theoretical bases for such practices also vary
widely. Some practitioners claim to be acting on the basis of
scientific knowledge, whereas othersact according to their
spiritual or religious beliefs. Also, the educational backgrounds of
practitioners differ widely. Korean traditional practitioners are
trained in schools that employ the same educational standards as
Western medical schools.'° Few African traditional healers, on the
other hand, will have had any classroom training in their
profession." The potential for causing harm also varies widely.
Whereas it is hard to see how a Canadian aroma therapist could do
any harm, the practice of bone setting in Africa involves
considerable risk.
Even though the diverse collection of practitioners considered
in this paper differ in many respects,. they also share many
common characteristics. Practitioners of Korean traditional
medicine, massage therapy, or African traditional medicine all
hold themselves out as being able to diagnose and treat illness or
ailments. Few traditional practitioners make any attempt to base
this practice on science or evidence.'2 Finally, like all medical
10 Chang-yup Kim & Byungmok Lim, Modernized Education of Traditional
Medicine in Korea: is it Contributing to the Same Type of Professionalization seen in
Western Medicine?, 58 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1999, 1999 (2004).
11 WHO (2001), supra note 1, at 5-41.
12 WHO (2002), supra note 2. The degree to which different types of traditional
medicine attempt to be science- or evidence-based varies. Some schools of traditional
medicine are making an attempt to become more evidence-based. See, e.g., RESEARCHES
IN AYURVEDA: PAST AND PRESENT (Vaidya Gaur & Vaidya Sharma eds., 2000)
(discussing the application of Ayurvedic medicine to a number of areas of medical
knowledge); SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR AYURVEDIC THERAPIES (Lakshmi Mishra ed., 2004)
(exploring the scientific basis for the Ayurvedic approach to disease diagnosis and
treatment). The editor in the latter work might object to the assertion that traditional
medicine is not evidence-based. The editor in fact suggests that Western medicine's
current emphasis on the need to be evidence-based means that it is becoming more like
Ayurvedic medicine which requires the practitioner use "the best available scientific data
about the efficacy of treatment modalities." Id. at 33. However the editor also seems to
acknowledge that most of the treatment modalities used in Ayurvedic medicine have
200 [Vol. XXXII
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practitioners, these practitioners make mistakes.' When mistakes
happen, people suffer.
One might also question the validity of lumping together
traditional practitioners from different countries. Many of the
considerations that are relevant in deciding whether or not to
regulate and whether regulations may be effective will vary from
country to country. Additionally, some countries, such as those in
Southeast and Southern Asia, have already developed educational
and regulatory institutions related to traditional medicine, 3
whereas others countries have not. The primary purpose of this
paper is to consider the wisdom of such regulation in developing
countries that have yet to regulate the profession. However, the
same considerations apply, to varying degrees, to all countries.
In addition to considering whether traditional medicine should
be regulated, this paper addresses the question of whether other
types of health practitioners should be regulated. Notably, this
paper will address whether a large group of Indian private
practitioners who are referred to either as rural medical
practitioners 4  (RMPs), less-than-fully-qualified 15  (LTFQ)
practitioners, or with the less than flattering -term "quacks" should
be regulated. 16  Like traditional practitioners in Africa, these
practitioners provide services for a large percentage of the Indian
population, 7 work in poor and rural areas, and have varying levels
of both education and proficiency. 8 These practitioners are said to
been derived solely from experience and have been passed on from generation to
generation. Id.
13 WHO (2001), supra note 1, at 129-41.
14 See, e.g., B.V. Sharma, Pilot Inventories of Unqualified Health Care Providers
in Two Districts in Andhara Pradesh at 6 (unpublished report to DFID India, British
High Commission India) (on file ,with the North Carolina Journal of International Law
and Commercial Regulation).
15 See, e.g., Peter Berman, Rethinking Health Care Systems: Private Health Care
Provisions in India, 26 WORLD DEV. 1463, 1474 (1998). Berman, infra note 19, at 1474.
16 According to a study conducted by the Association of Medical Consultants
(AMC) in 1998, there are around 1.5 million "quacks" in India. IMA Lodges Complaint
Against 25 Quacks, EXPRESS HEALTHCARE MGMT. available at http://www.
expresshealthcaremgmt.com/20020715/hospi5.shtml# (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
17 Id.
18 Sharma, supra note 14.
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practice a mixture of allopathic and traditional medicine.' 9 At one
time RMPs were licensed, but this process came to an end in the
mid- 1970s.2 °
The second caveat also pertains to generalizing about
traditional practitioners. The question of whether to regulate
traditional practitioners seems to be a global problem, so this
paper attempts a global approach. The subject is an immense one.
Thoroughly canvassing all of the relevant, literature would be
impossible. The discussion here draws primarily from English
speaking countries with common law legal systems: the United
States, Canada, English speaking Africa, and India. The United
States was chosen because of its long history of regulation and the
abundance of academic literature that it has engendered. Africa
and India were chosen because the issue (regulating traditional
practitioners in the case of Africa, and formally unqualified
allopathic practitioners in the case of India) is a particularly ripe
one. In these two regions, governments are faced with similar
problems in trying to decide how to regulate poorly educated
practitioners of perhaps dubious quality. The problem is
compounded by the governments' lack of resources and the fact
that in these countries traditional practitioners provide much of the
healthcare.
III. Making The Case For Regulation
This section looks at some of the literature relating to the
harmful effects of certain traditional practices. The purpose of this
section is not to blacken the name of traditional medicine. Like a
surgeon colleague of mine is fond of saying, "what can go wrong,
does go wrong, will go wrong."21 What this means is that even the
best clinicians sometimes experience failures and therefore
Western medicine has its share of horror stories. The purpose of
this section is only to attempt to show that a problem exists.
Traditional medical practices are not always benign. Some
practices pose real public health threats which merit regulation
19 Berman, supra note 15 at 1465.
20 Id. at 1474.
21 Basil MacNamara, Chief of Surgery at Vila Central Hospital, Port Vila, Vanuatu,
has considerable experience as a surgeon in developing countries and is an excellent
clinician.
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where they are not adequately addressed by informal mechanisms.
The extent of the problem (and therefore the need for regulation)
will vary from country to country and from one type of traditional
medicine to another.
A. Africa
A Medline 2 search combining "traditional medicine" and
"Africa" turns up primarily two types of articles:
ethnopharmacology papers testing traditional medicines in vitro
(few if any are clinical trials) and case series describing adverse
effects arising from the use of traditional medicine.23 The types of
practices that most commonly give rise to problems include
traditional birth practices, 24 bone setting,25 and treatment of eye
disease.26  Inadvertent poisoning and delayed referrals also
constitute significant problems.27
One Nigerian study showed that the babies of women
delivered in an "unorthodox health center" had a significantly
higher incidence of birth asphyxia 28 than did babies born in a
hospital.29 The birth asphyxia death rate in this study was 20.8%.30
Other Nigerian case series have documented a number of other
adverse outcomes arising from the delivery practices of
Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs). 31 These adverse effects
22 See MEDLINE, supra note 5.
23 Although some of these studies have some epidemiological shortcomings, they
serve to indicate that a problem exists.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 28-35.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 45-49.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
28 Birth Asphyxia is defined as a "[b]aby not crying soon after delivery despite
stimulation." S. Etuk & I. Etuk, Relative Risk of Birth Asphyxia in Babies of Booked
Woman Who Deliver in Unorthodox Health Facilities in Calabar, Nigeria, 79 ACTA
TROPICA 143, 144 (2001).
29 Id. at 145.
30 Id.
31 E. Alabi, Cultural Practices in Nigeria, 9 INTER-AFRICAN COMM. TRADITIONAL
PRACTICES AFFECTING WOMAN & CHILDREN 6 (1990); 0. Mabogunje, Ritual Hot Baths
(Wankan-jego) in Zaria, Nigeria, 9 INTER-AFRICAN COMM. TRADITIONAL PRACTICES
AFFECTING WOMAN & CHILDREN 10 (1990).
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include vesicovaginal fistulas32 after primitive symphysiotomies, 3
"agurya cut" (the removal of the hymen in seven day old female
infants),34 and mothers subjected to bathing in boiling water.35
Numerous studies have documented poisoning due to
traditional medicine.36 "An analysis of Johannesburg forensic data
between the years 1991-1995 found 206 cases where traditional
remedy was either stated to be the cause of death or discovered
during the autopsy when the cause of death was poisoning due to
an unknown substance., 37 Interestingly, in 38% of the cases the
poison turned out to be pharmaceutical or industrial toxins.38
Similarly, Queen Elizabeth Central Hospital in Malawi reported
six deaths due to traditional medicine intoxication in a one-year
period.39 In the Chibwana study, the authors cautioned that
"traditional medicines are particularly dangerous to give infants
less than one year old."4 ° Another South African study reported a
clinical syndrome associated with the use of traditional enemas for
sick children.4' "Enema syndrome" is characterized by sudden
deterioration after administration of a traditional enema.42
Abdominal distension, respiratory distress, hypotonia, and loss of
32 A vesicovaginal fistula is a tract linking the bladder to the vagina. This causes
urine to leak into the vagina. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 731, 2121 (28th ed.
2006).
33 A symphysiotomies is a surgical procedure that entails cutting the ligament
holding together the symphysis pubis. Id. at 1884.
34 INTER-AFR. COMM. ON TRADITIONAL PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF
WOMEN & CHILDREN, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, available at http://www.iac-
ciaf.com/whatisfgm.htm (select "Types of Female Genital Mutilation" hyperlink).
35 Mabogunje, supra note 31, at 10.
36 See, e.g., Chibwana et al., Childhood Poisoning at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital,
Blantyre, Malawi, 78(6) E. AFR. MED. J. 292 (2001); M. Stewart et al., Findings in Fatal
Cases of Poisonings Attributed to Traditional Remedies in South Africa 101(3) FORENSIC
SCI. INT'L 177 (1999).
37 Stewart et al., supra note 36, at 177.
38 Id. at 179.
39 Chibwana et al., supra note 36, at 292.
40 Id. at 292.
41 D. Moore & N. Moore, Paediatric Enema Syndrome in a Rural African Setting,
18 ANNALS TROPICAL PEDIATRICS 139 (1998).
42 Id. at 139.
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consciousness were reported.43 Mortality amongst the fifty cases
was reported as 28%.'
Other studies have reported adverse outcomes arising from
treatment by traditional bonesetters (TBS).45 One Nigerian case
series reported that of the 225 limb amputations performed over a
ten year period, 63.2% were the result of trauma that had been
inappropriately treated by traditional practitioners.46 Another
Nigerian study found that of thirty-six fractures that were first
treated by TBS, over half ended up with mal-unions,47 and another
quarter had non-unions.48 In contrast, only 14% of the control
group (treated by Western doctors only) suffered complications,
primarily stiff joints.49
A number of studies have documented permanent eye injury
following the use of traditional medicine for eye problems.5" One
of these studies from Tanzania showed that 25% of corneal ulcers
were associated with the use of traditional medicine.5 Several
papers have also documented traditional medicine as a frequent
cause of renal failure in Africa.52
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See, e.g., E. Garba & P. Deshi, Traditional Bone Setting: a Risk Factor in Limb
Amputation, 75 E. Aim. MED. J. 553 (1999); D. Olaolorun et al., Complications of
Fracture Treatment by Traditional Bonesetters in Southwest Nigeria, 18 FAM. PRAC. 635
(2001); J. Onuminya et al., Traditional Bone Setter's Gangrene, 23 INT'L ORTHOPEDICS
111 (1999).
46 Garba & Deshi, supra note 45, at 553; see also Onuminya et al., supra note 45.
47 Olaolorun et al., supra note 45, at 635.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 636-37.
50 See, e.g., Paul Courtwright et al., Traditional Medicine Use Among Patients with
Corneal Disease in Rural Malawi, 78(11) BRIT. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 810, 811 (1994);
Susan Lewallen & Paul Courtwright, Role for Traditional Healers in Eye Care 345
LANCET 456, 456 (1995); Thodosia E. McMoli et al., Epidemic Acute Hemorrhagic
Conjunctivitis in Lagos, Nigeria, 68 BRIT. J. OPHTHALMOLOGY 401, 401 (1984); James
Mselle, Visual Impact of Using Traditional Medicine on the Injured Eye in Africa 70
ACTA TROPICA 185, 185 (1998).
51 D. Yorston & A. Foster, Traditional Eye Medicine and Corneal Ulceration in
Tanzania, 97 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 211, 211 (1994).
52 See, e.g., V. Luyckx et al., Herbal Remedy-Associated Acute Renal Failure
Secondary to Cape Aloes, 39 AM. J. KIDNEY DISEASE E13 (2002); L.S. Otieno et al.,
Acute Renal Failure Following the use of Herbal Remedies, 68 E. AFR. MED. J. 993
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Failing to refer patients who would benefit from Western
medicine is another common problem. A case report from Malawi
found that of eighty-nine patients with tuberculosis, 37% reported
having consulted a traditional healer before seeking medical
attention.53 The healer treated these patients for an average of four
weeks during which twenty-four of thirty-three deteriorated.5 4
None were referred to doctors." Similarly, in Madagascar,
traditional practitioners are said to rarely refer patients with
cerebral malaria (a disease with a very high mortality rate if left
untreated) to doctors.56 Traditional healers fail to refer these
patients despite the fact that they can offer no effective treatment
for the condition.5 7
A case report from Benin stated that frequent injuries resulting
from traditional treatment administered for childhood
convulsions.5 8 Harmful traditional treatments included flagellation
to revive the child, oral administration of urine (from cows or cats)
or rubbing alcohol, as well as plunging a limb into boiling water,
or into fire, in an attempt to revive the unconscious posticta 5 9
child.6 °
(1991); R. Wood et al., Acute Dichromate Poisoning After Use of Traditional
Purgatives. A Report of 7 Cases, 77 S. AFR. MED. J. 640 (1990).
53 J. Brouwer et al., Traditional Healers and Pulmonary Tuberculosis in Malawi, 2
INT'L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 231, 231 (1998).
54 Id.
55 Between 1989-90, the author worked in Good Shepherd Hospital, Siteki,
Swaziland. During that period this author saw numerous patients with advanced cases of
tuberculosis. Many of these patients had been receiving treatment from traditional
practitioners for prolonged periods before visiting the hospital. As a result of the delay
in seeking treatment many, of these people were so far advanced in their disease that
they could not be saved.
56 Karin Leder & Peter Weller, Epidemiology, Pathogenesis, Clinical Features,
and Diagnosis of Malaria (Burton D. Rose ed., 2006), www.UptoDate.com.
57 Sheri Fink, International Efforts Spotlight Traditional, Complementary, and
Alternative Medicine, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1734, 1736 (2002).
58 D. Ayivi, Accidents Linked to Traditional Treatment of Convulsions of Infants
and Children in Benin, 85 DEV. ET SANTE 25 (1990).
59 After a generalized seizure there is normally a period of decreased level of
consciousness or confusion. The term "post-ictal" is used to describe this period.
STEDMAN'S DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 1546.
60 Ayivi, supra note 58, at 25.
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B. India
A Medline search of Indian traditional medicine reveals, as
with the African literature, ethnopharmacology research showing
some in vitro evidence that traditional medicines may be
efficacious. 61  In comparison to Africa, there are significantly
fewer case series reporting adverse outcomes attributable to the
practice of traditional Indian medicine.
India's "private doctors ' are an eclectic mixture of people
with a range of qualifications in an assortment of medical
traditions.63 Sorting out who practices what may be difficult. For
example, many practitioners of Indian traditional medicine
(particularly Ayurvedic practitioners) include allopathic treatment
in their practice.' In addition to differences in schools of practice,
there are large numbers of "medical practitioners" who have no
formal qualifications of any kind.65 These RMPs are said to
practice a mixture of allopathic and traditional medicine.66
Surprisingly, given the large numbers of traditional healers and
unqualified practitioners practicing in India, there are few, if any,
large scale studies or case series looking at adverse outcomes
resulting from such practices. However, there are a number of
anecdotal reports of malpractice in the popular press. These
reports implicate unqualified practitioners more often than
traditional practitioners. For instance, in Delhi, a sixteen year old
girl died while having her tongue operated on to prevent
stuttering.67 An unqualified practitioner gave an injection to a
61 See, e.g., Ichikawa et. al., Withanolides Potentiate Apoptosis, Inhibit Invasion,
and Abolish Osteoclastogenesis Through Suppression of Nuclear Factor-kappaB (NF-
kappaB) Activation and NF-kappaB-regulated Gene Expression, 5(6) MOLECULAR
CANCER THERAPEUTICS 1436 (2006); R. Anandharagen et. al., In Vitro Glucose Uptake
Activity of Aegles Marmelos and Syzygium Cumini by Activation of Glut-4, P13 Kinase
and PPARgamma in L6 myotubes, 13(6) PHYTOMEDICINE 434 (2006)
62 See HEMA VISHWANATHAN & JON ELIOT ROHDE, DIARRHOEA IN RURAL INDIA: A
NATION WIDE SURVEY OF MOTHERS AND PRACTITIONERS 74 (1990). According to the
authors, 62% of "rural doctors" have no formal qualifications. Id.
63 Berman, supra note 15, at 1472-73; Ramesh Bhat, Regulation of the Private
Health Sector in India, 11 INT'L J. HEALTH PLAN. & MGMT. 253, 257 (1996).
64 Berman, supra note 15, at 1472.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1473.
67 Girl Dies on Quack's "Operation Table", EXPRESS NEWS SERVICE, June 7, 2004,
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woman with a fever, who died the next day.68 In Uttar Pradesh, a
woman went to an unqualified doctor for the delivery of a baby.69
After complications ensued, the "doctor" had to "amputate" part of
the baby.7° The mother later bled to death.7' In Kerala, a woman
died after registered practitioners of Indian traditional medicine
performed a therapeutic abortion.72
Many of the problems associated with traditional practices in
Africa also occur in India. There have been a number of case
reports of heavy metal poisoning due to Indian traditional
medicines.73 Bonesetter's gangrene has also been observed in the
Indian subcontinent.7 4 The failure to appropriately refer patients is
also a problem. One study reported that although 75% of RMPs
claimed they referred patients regularly to public health facilities,
only 38.7% had done so in the three months prior to the survey.75
A number of studies have suggested that the overall quality of
many private medical practitioners in India is inadequate.76 One
study assessing sick infants concluded that unqualified
practitioners provided a poor quality of care; however, it also
found that traditional and allopathic practitioners did not provide
significantly better services.77 Another study from Bombay found
http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=86794.
68 Celia Dugger, Deserted by Doctors, India's Poor turn to Quacks, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 2004, at Al.
69 Rashme Sehgal, UP's Women Die in Childbirth for Want of a Four-Rupee Dai
Kit, INFOCHANGE, 7 (May 2004), http://www.infochangeindia.org/features169.jsp.
70 Id. 7.
71 Id.
72 Dr. K. Mahabala Bhat v. K. Krishna, 2000 CPR 369 (Ker 1999).
73 See, e.g., R.W. Keen et al., Indian Herbal Remedies for Diabetes as a Cause of
Lead Poisoning, 70 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 113 (1994); J. Kew et al., Arsenic and
Mercury Intoxication due to Indian Ethnic Remedies, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 506 (1993).
74 See G. Walker, Traditional Bonesetters Gangrene (letter), 23 INT'L
ORTHOPEDICS 192 (1999).
75 Sharma, supra note 14, at 56.
76 See Isabelle de Zoysa et al., Careseeking for Illness in Young Infants in an
Urban Slum in India, 47 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2101, 2101 (1998); C. Ashok Yesudian,
Behavior of the Private Sector in the Health Market of Bombay, 9 HEALTH POL'Y &
PLAN. 72, 76 (1994).
77 Zoysa et al., supra note 76, at 2108.
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that a majority of key health sector personnel78 thought
"malpractice was rampant in the private sector., 79
As in many parts of the world, unsafe private abortions are a
problem in India.8 ° According to one study, two to four of the
fifteen to twenty abortions performed by "informal practitioners"
each year in Kampur City, Uttar Pradesh result in "complications,"
including death.8 Additionally, it has been estimated that 4-5 %
of the pregnant women seen with acute bleeding at the University
College of Medical Sciences have been "mishandled by untrained
people who pretend to be doctors or dais.'82 Another study from
Madhya Pradesh found that sixteen of twenty "informal
practitioners" were using bogus medications as abortificants.83
C. Other Countries
Literature from other countries also documents adverse
outcomes from the use of traditional practices. A 1995 case series
from a hospital in Enga Province, Papua New Guinea reported 183
patients with complications of "bush thoracotomies. ' '84 A "bush
thoracotomy is a procedure performed by traditional healers,
involving an attempt to open the pleural cavity to let out "bad
blood. 85  Of the patients presented, most had either empyemas
78 Yesudian, supra note 76, at 72.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Vanita Jain et al., Unsafe Abortion: A Neglected Tragedy Review from
a Tertiary Care Hospital in India, 30(3) J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY RES. 197
(2004) (presenting data from a study looking at emergency gynecologic admissions to a
tertiary care center in India over a 15-year period).
81 Alex George, Address at Abortion: a Symposium on the Multiple Facets of
Medical Termination of Pregnancy: From Decoctions to Instruments (Dec. 2003)
(transcript available at http://www.india-seminar.comV2003/532/532%20alex%20
george.htm).
82 Sanchita Sharma, Delhi takes Scalpel to Cut Quackery, INDIA EXPRESS
NEWSPAPERS, Oct. 2, 1998, available at http://www.expressindia.comie/daily/
19981002/27550024.html (quoting a doctor on the condition of anonymity).
83 Alex George, Informal Providers of Abortion Care in Two Blocks of Madhya
Pradesh and Social Perception About Them (Centre for Health & Social Sector Studies
2003) available at www.cehat.org/aap I/mp.pdf.
84 J.J. Wallace & J. Tharion, Complications of Bush Thoracotomy in the Highlands
of Papua New Guinea, 65 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. SURGERY 183, 183 (1995).
85 Id.
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(puss in the pleural cavity) or superficial infections.86 Two deaths
were reported.87
Certain traditional Mexican practices have been shown to be
either harmful or potentially harmful. Some Mexican remedies
have been found to be hepatotoxic.88 Other Mexican traditional
medications have been found to be primarily composed of lead,89
or to be the cause of clinical lead poisoning.9
Pneumonia is the leading cause of child mortality in the
Philippines. 91  Studies have found that the delay in seeking
medical treatment for respiratory infections is often attributable to
parents first bringing their children to a traditional practitioner.92
Likewise, in the Nusa Tenggara Barat province of Indonesia,
where the infant mortality rate is estimated to be between 125 and
200 per 1,000 live births, many people first consult a traditional
healer.93 Some of these traditional practitioners were observed
treating gastroenteritis with coffee, while others used injections of
unknown substances.94 Another Indonesian study looked at child
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Moustapha Bah et al., Hepatotoxic Pyrrolizidine Alkaloids in the Mexican
Medicinal Plant Packera Candidissima (Asteraceae: Senecioneae), 43 J.
ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 19, 19 (1994).
89 Leticia Yanez et al., Toxicological Assessment of Azarcon, a Lead Salt Used as a
Folk Remedy in Mexico: 1. Oral Toxicity in Rats, 41 J. ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 91, 91
(1994).
90 Center for Disease Control, Childhood Lead Poisoning Associated with
Tamarind Candy and Folk Remedies-California, 1999-2000, 51 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 684, 685 (2002).
91 REPORT OF THE PHIL. DEP'T OF HEALTH, CHILD MORTALITY: TEN (10) LEADING
CAUSES OF CHILD MORTALITY BY AGE-GROUP (1-4, 5-9, 10-14) & SEX No. &
RATE/100,000 POPULATION PHILIPPINES, 2000 (2000), http://www.doh.gov.ph/data-stat/
html/childmort.htm.
92 Andrew McNee et al., Responding to Cough: Boholano Illness Classification
and Resort to Care in Response to Childhood ARl, 40 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1279, 1283-84
(1995); Mark Nichter & Mimi Nichter, Acute Respiratory Illness: Popular Health
Culture and Mother's Knowledge in the Philippines, 15 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY 353, 370
(1994).
93 Jocelyn Grace, The Treatment of Infants and Young Children Suffering
Respiratory Tract Infection and Diarrhoeal Disease in a Rural Community in Southeast
Indonesia, 46 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1291, 1291 (1998).
94 Id. at 1296-97.
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(under five) mortality in 10,000 households over an eighteen
month period starting in July 1991.9' Of the 141 deaths in this age
group, fifty-nine children (42%) were found to have only received
treatment by a traditional practitioner before they died, while
another 22% received no treatment outside the home.96
The Philippine and Indonesian examples illustrate an
important principle. They show that to ask traditional and CAM
practitioners to "do no harm" is to ask too little. If visiting a
traditional practitioner means a critical delay in seeking medical
advice then the resultant harm can be just as devastating as when
the harm results from a direct act.
IV. Why Regulate?
Why should a government want to regulate traditional
practitioners? After reading the above section, the answer may
seem self-evident: to prevent harm. However, the academic
literature on healthcare regulation offers a more complicated
answer. People who believe in the free market would argue that
regulation is only necessary in order to compensate for market
failures.97
Several types of market imperfections occur in the context of
healthcare services. In order to have a perfect market, there needs
to be perfect information.98 That is to say, the consumer has to
know "exactly what they want and how they can get it." 99 Only
then will the consumer know how much he or she is willing to
pay. Of course this is practically never the case in healthcare.' °
95 Bambang. Sutrisna et al., Care-Seeking for Fatal Illnesses in Young Children in
Indramayu, West Java, Indonesia, 342 LANCET 787 (1993).
96 Id. at 787.
97 See, e.g., ROBERT BALDWIN & MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 19
(1999); ROBERT BALDWIN ET AL., A READER ON REGULATION 9 (1998); Stephen Breyer,
Typical Justifications for Regulation , in A READER ON REGULATION 59 (Robert Baldwin
et al. ed., 1998); MARC ROBERTS ET AL., GETTING HEALTH REFORM RIGHT (2004); Linette
McNamara et al., Regulation of Health Care Professionals, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW
AND POLICY 55, 56-60 (Jocelyn Downie et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
98 See, e.g., McNamara et al., supra note 97, at 57; ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97,
at 249.
99 CAM DONALDSON & KAREN GERARD, ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING:
THE VISIBLE HAND 21 (1993).
100 See McNamara et al., supra note 97, at 57; ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97, at
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The patient usually goes to the practitioner precisely because they
do not know what is wrong with them. In addition, buying
healthcare is not like buying a mango. When someone buys a
mango they know what they are paying for. The same cannot be
said for buying healthcare. Patients do not know what the
alternative diagnosis might be, what the treatment options are, or
anything about the practitioner's level of knowledge and skills.1 01
Although imperfect information constitutes a major barrier to
the formation of an efficient market for health services in
developed countries, the problem is potentially much worse in
many developing countries. The population in such countries is
usually less educated than in developed countries and is less likely
to have access to sources of information such as the print media,
television, or the internet.
Another requirement for a perfect market is that the individual
transaction will not have any effect on third parties. In economic
terms, there can be no "externalities."' °2 If externalities exist, then
the real costs and benefits of the agreement are not being borne by
the parties to the agreement but rather by third parties.0 3 The
possibility of externalities arises not altogether infrequently in the
context of health care."°  For example, say a patient has
tuberculosis (TB) and visits the doctor. The doctor misdiagnoses
the patient and sends him or her home with a cough syrup. The
patient dies six months later from a myocardial infarction
completely unrelated to the TB. Although the patient may be
happy enough with the treatment, six other people get infected
with TB because the cough syrup does not stop the spread of the
disease. Infection of the additional people is an externality.
For a perfect market there also needs to be true competition
249.
101 See McNamara et al., supra note 97, at 57; ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97, at
249.
102 See, e.g., McNamara et al., supra note 97 at 57; ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97,
at 249.
103 See, e.g., McNamara et al., supra note 97 at 57; ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97,
at 249.
104 See, e.g., McNamara et al., supra note 97, at 57; ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97,
at 249.
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among suppliers.° 5 There can be no monopoly. In the context of
the market for traditional medicine, this is yet another condition
that may not be fulfilled. Some people have no alternative other
than to use traditional practitioners. This may be because access
to Western medical facilities may be physically difficult or
impossible, 116 or because the cost of using Western medicine
constitutes an economic barrier.107
It may come as no surprise that conditions may not exist for a
perfect market, as economists agree that rarely, if ever, is there a
"perfect market." Rather, market failure is a question of degree
and therefore the need for regulatory intervention should depend
on the nature and the degree of market failure. That being said, it
has been suggested that extensive government involvement is
particularly warranted in the healthcare context.10 8 This is because
none of the conditions for a perfect market exist and instead there
is complete market failure.'09
Of all the market imperfections associated with healthcare
delivery, the most important from the regulatory point of view, is
imperfect knowledge. This was the basis for the United States
Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of
mandatory licensing of doctors in 1889.110 Justice Field stated the
following in that judgment:
Every one may have occasion to consult him [a doctor], but
comparatively few can judge of the qualifications of learning
and skill which he possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the
105 See, e.g., ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97, at 249; McNamara, supra note 97,
at 57.
106 See Litiana Kuridrani, Institutionalizing Traditional Medicine in the Fiji Islands,
TOK BLONG PASIFIK, Spring 2002, at 13; Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations [FAO], Forest Products Division, Marketing of Indigenous Medicinal
Plants in South Africa-A Case Study in Kwazulu Natal U.N. Doc. W9195/E (1998)
(prepared by Myles Mander); WHO (2001), supra note 1, at 3.
107 WHO (2001), supra note I, at 3; Zimbabwe: Boom for Traditional Healers as
Health Care Costs Rise, IRINNEWS.ORG, Aug. 22, 2004, http://www.irinnews.org/
print.asp?ReportlD=40866.
108 McNamara et al., supra note 97 at 57; DONALDSON & GERARD, supra note 99, at
28.
109 McNamara et al., supra note 97 at 57; DONALDSON & GERARD, supra note 99, at
28.
110 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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assurance given by his license, issued by an authority competent
to judge in that respect, that he possesses the requisite
qualifications. 1 "
A second reason for regulating healthcare is as a means of
reducing transaction costs."l 2  Many formal and informal
constraints may be viewed as ways of reducing transaction costs.
Regulations are one formal way of reducing these costs.
The adverse health outcomes resulting from traditional
practitioners enumerated in the section above can be seen as
arising from market imperfections. Presumably, a well-informed
consumer would: 1) choose to avoid a traditional bone setter if
they realized that using such services greatly increased his or her
chance of requiring an amputation, 2) choose to go directly to a
medical practitioner when they had tuberculosis, or 3) avoid
traditional medicines with the knowledge that they had the
potential to cause corneal scarring and blindness.
Another way to look at the problem is in terms of transaction
costs. In poor countries, the cost of acquiring the requisite
information to make an informed choice as to whether to use a
traditional practitioner is often prohibitively high. The usual
sources of information available in the village include
grandmother's advice, the reputation of the traditional practitioner
(learned by word of mouth), and previous experience with the
practitioner. These sources are easy and inexpensive to obtain. In
contrast, information about the comparative advantages of
Western medicine, its scientific basis, and empirical evidence of
its effectiveness, is less accessible and more expensive to acquire.
The same is true for ascertaining whether a particular traditional
practitioner is actually effective. Although complete information
may lead to better treatment and thus a more desirable outcome,
the higher costs of obtaining such information are more immediate
to the consumer. Therefore, transaction costs favor choosing a
practitioner based on cheap but inaccurate information, rather than
making a decision based on more expensive but accurate
information.
Regulatory intervention can alter transaction costs in a
IlI Id. at 122-23.
112 See ROBERTS ET AL., supra note 97, at 249; DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 27-36 (1990).
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multitude of ways.' 13  A simple example is a license, which
provides the consumer with inexpensive but valuable information
about the practitioner. By reducing information costs associated
with obtaining accurate information it allows for more complete
wealth capture.
Lastly, there is another reason for the need for government
intervention in the transaction between practitioners and their
clients. This reason illustrates a shortcoming in the economics
paradigm. Economists measure value in terms of subjective
utility.'14 In the context of the poor and uneducated, there may be
cases where the patient is happy with the results of his or her
transaction, but in reality, suffers as a result of inadequate
treatment. Take for example the healer who tells his patient that
his cough and loss of weight are the result of bad medicine put on
him by a witchdoctor at the instigation of a village rival."5 The
villager may be perfectly content with the healer's diagnosis. The
only action the villager takes, relating to the diagnosis, is to
prompt his family to assault, or burn down the house of the rival or
the witchdoctor. 16 Although the villager has no complaint about
the treatment he has received, he eventually will die a premature
death due to TB, a treatable disease." 7 Would the economist say
that the government has a role in intervening in this sort of
transaction? Perhaps because there are negative externalities (the
possibility of transmission of disease), but assume there were
none. Perhaps there was incomplete information. The villager, in
this example, did not know that he had TB, and maybe if he had
known he would not have chosen to transact with the healer. But,
113 See NORTH, supra note 112, at 46-47.
114 See Marc Roberts & Michael Reich, Ethical Analysis in Public Health, 359
LANCET 1055, 1055-56 (2002) (explaining how different ethical schools of thought can
lead to different conclusions as to what is desirable in healthcare).
115 See Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft
Says for the Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 62, 76-77 (2003)
(regarding traditional cultural attitudes toward illness in South Africa); Donald Pollock,
Healing Dilemmas, 69 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 149, 151 (1996) (describing the traditional
belief about disease causation held by the Kulina of western Brazil).
116 See generally Ludsin, supra note 115 (regarding the violence associated with the
use of witchcraft in South Africa).
117 See, e.g., John Bass, General Principles of Treatment of Tuberculosis, Aug.
2006, www.UpToDate.com (discussing the treatment of tuberculosis).
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suppose that even if he was told he might have TB, he preferred
the traditional healer's explanation. According to the classic
economic model there are no market imperfections in this scenario
and therefore regulatory intervention to prevent this sort of
outcome would not be justified.
Many people would, however, consider government
intervention to prevent the occurrence of the above scenario to be
both legitimate and desirable. To advocate such a position is to
adopt an objective utilitarian position." 8 According to this view,
the government has an interest, and perhaps a paramount interest,
in the well-being of the citizenry regardless of whether the
citizenry is subjectively content with the treatment that they are
receiving. The judgment of the United States Supreme Court in
Dent v. West Virginia reflects this ethical position in stating that
"[t]he power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its
people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its
judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity.
' 1 9
V. Informal Constraints
Before considering the role of regulations, it is worth
considering the alternative. Legal rules constitute only a small,
but significant, part of the total constraints on human behavior. 2
0
There are many other types of constraints, both formal and
informal. Such constraints range from "taboos, customs, and
traditions at one end to written constitutions at the other.'
121
Macauley's 1963 study of business practices in Wisconsin was
one of the earliest works suggesting informal constraints may be
more important than legal constraints. 122 Macauley found that,
despite the existence of formal legal contracts, merchants rarely
sued when sales contracts were broken.1
2 3
118 See Roberts & Reich, supra note 114, at 1055-56.
119 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
120 NORTH, supra note 112, at 36.
121 Id. at 46.
122 Stewart Macauly, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: a Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60-62 (1963).
123 Id.
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In the late 1980's Robert Ellickson went to rural California to
see how cattle ranchers solved disputes over wayward cattle.
24
He found that people rarely brought their disputes to court.'
25
Instead they resorted to informal constraints in resolving
disputes. 126 He concluded that "adaptive norms of neighborliness
trump formal legal entitlements."' 127 Studies of different American
communities have come to similar conclusions; non-legal
constraints are often more important than legal constraints. 128
Other examples are Lisa Bernstein's examination of relations
within the New York diamond dealers, 129 Bernstein's study of the
cotton industry,"3 ° and James Acheson's study of Maine lobster
fisherman. 3' It has even been suggested that the behavior of
lawyers in the United States is primarily regulated through the use
of informal constraints. 132
Informal constraints can be broadly classified into the
following groups: self-imposed constraints (personal ethics),
regulation by those who are directly party to a transaction,
informal third party constraints (cultural norms), and formal and
informal third party constraints (networks, trade associations and
the like).' The different forms of constraints interact with each
124 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
125 Id. at 1.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 4.
128 Id.
129 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
130 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commekcial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
131 See JAMES ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988).
132 Bradley W. Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms
in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955 (2001) [hereinafter Wendel
(2001)]; Bradley W. Wendel, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Regulation of
Lawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the Restatement: or, what do Honor and Shame
Have to Do with Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1567 (2003)
[hereinafter Wendel (2003)].
133 See Douglass North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World
Development, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT
17, 23 (John Harriss ed., 1997); Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L.
REV. 1179, 1186 (2003); ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 126-32.
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
other, sometimes; -undermining, but most often reinforcing one
another.
Informal constraints may play a role in controlling the
behavior of traditional practitioners, helping to ensure the
provision of quality services. Indeed, in the absence of formal
regulation they are the only constraint. A government interested
in safeguarding the health of the population may therefore want to
know whether these informal mechanisms are adequate. The
following section looks at the various forms of informal
constraints and how they may act to constrain the behavior of
traditional practitioners.
A. Repeat Dealing, Reputation, and Informal Sanctions
Economists have argued that in a unique, non-simultaneous
transaction where the two parties have little knowledge of each
other and there is no third party enforcement mechanism, there
will be a temptation for one or both parties to cheat. 13 4 This is
because economists see people as primarily wealth-maximizing,
and therefore predisposed to taking advantage of each other. 3 5
This scenario may potentially lead to an inefficient outcome when
one or both parties choose to forego a potentially profitable
exchange rather than risk being cheated. This is known as the
prisoner's dilemma. 13
6
Game Theory suggests that cooperation can arise
spontaneously, in the absence of third-party enforcement, when
two conditions are met: the game is repeated and the two parties
have complete information about each other's past performance.'37
These conditions can best be met in small communities,138 "close-
knit" communities,' 39 where there is "lock-in,' 140 where the
134 See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 112, at 12-13; ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS 11-12 (2000).
135 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 134, at 150.
136 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7 (1984); NORTH,
supra note 112, at 13; POSNER, supra note 134, at 12.
137 AXELROD, supra note 136, at 125.
138 See NORTH, supra note 112, at 34; ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 182.
139 ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 177-82.
140 John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional
Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2421, 2426 (2000).
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availability of trading partners is limited,141  through
"clientization, ' ' 142 when dealing with family, relatives, 143 or within
a homogeneous ethnic community.'"
Those who have spent time in developing countries where the
rule of law is weak may recognize the relevance of this theory.
Whereas in small communities there may be a high degree of
honesty, doing business in a large community may be frustrating.
It is not only outsiders who experience these problems. Geertz
found that in the Moroccan bazaar "the pervasive ignorance
regarding the quality of goods, and the reliability of traders is
mitigated by 'clientization. ' ' '"
45
Although this kind of private ordering is of particular
relevance in developing countries where the rule of law is weak, 146
it is also important in the business community of developed
countries. 147  This is because informal means of ensuring
cooperation are easier to use and less costly than the legal system.
In other words, the use of informal mechanisms reduces
transaction costs. 148  In addition, non-legal enforcement
mechanisms may be preferable because they are less likely to sour
relationships. 14
9
141 Id.
142 See Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant
Marketing, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 30 (1978). Clientization is "the pairing off of buyers
and sellers in repetitive transactions." Richard Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society
with Special Reference to Law, 23 J. L. & EcON 1, 3 (1980).
143 See Posner, supra note 142, at 12.,
144 See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140, at 2433-34.
145 Geertz, supra note 142, at 31.
146 McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140, at 2446-48 (presenting some empirical
evidence in support of this proposition). See generally NORTH, supra note 112, at 37-39
(discussing the importance of informal structures in constraining behavior in primitive
societies); Posner, supra note 142, at 8.
147 McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140, at 2425 (discussing how relational
contracting continues to exist even in countries with sophisticated legal systems);
NORTH, supra note 112, at 39-40; POSNER, supra note 134, at 149-50 (discussing the
importance of repeat dealing, reputation, and membership in social circles to in modem
commercial relations); see generally David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial
Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375 (1990).
148 See ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 281; McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140,
at 2425; NORTH, supra note 133.
149 See ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 62.
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Repeat dealing is not always possible. Even in small
communities, parties may rarely have occasion for repeat
transactions with each other. Parties are often unfamiliar with
each others' past performance as well. When this is the case, one
or both parties may be tempted to cheat. This temptation can be
reduced if information about behavior is spread from one person to
another. Gossip is a means of sharing such information.150 It is a
particularly important form of information sharing in small
communities, whether the small community is a village or a group
of individuals who share a profession. 5' Gossip determines an
individual's reputation, which in turn becomes a cheap and easy
basis for deciding with whom to transact. It is not surprising
therefore that reputation152  and honor'53  are of particular
importance in cultures where there is no recourse to legal
enforcement.
Repeat dealing, personal knowledge, knowledge of reputation
or the personal information gained through gossip reduces
transaction costs, as it provides an inexpensive way of ensuring
that individuals only do business with those who will likely keep
their end of the bargain. In the absence of third party enforcement
mechanisms, the threat of informal sanctions can also be used to
ensure enforcement of an agreement after it has been made. In
California, ranchers may threaten to seize or kill trespassing cattle,
or in Maine those who trespass on someone else's territory may
find their lobster pots have been sabotaged."' Lawyers will make
life difficult for those who are seen to act improperly by excluding
them from referral networks and by refusing to extend to them the
usual time-saving informalities like carrying out transactions on
150 Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 20 (2004); ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at
181.
151 Wendel (2003), supra note 132, at 1605.
152 POSNER, supra note 134, at 218; see also Chamy, supra note 147, at 393
(discussing the importance of reputation as a nonlegal sanction in commercial relations);
Aviram supra note 133, at 1193 (discussing the private ordering literature in general)
153 POSNER, supra note 134, at 218; Posner, supra note 142, at 27; Wendel (2003),
supra note 132, at 1605-06.
154 ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 58; James Acheson, Lobster Trap Limits: A
Solution to a Communal Action Problem, 57(I) HUM. ORG. 43, 47 (1998).
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the telephone.'55
The threat of violence also plays an important role in some
societies 5 6  and in certain subcultures within developed
countries.'57 Not only is the threat of immediate violence an
important motivating factor in some countries, the mere possibility
of violence often has special relevance in that it may result in an
ongoing feud between families, tribes, or clans.'58 The desire to
avoid a feud can therefore be a powerful incentive for people to
ensure that their own family or tribal members engage in fair
dealing.
Informal sanctions can also be particularly effective when they
threaten to impinge on an individual's personal life. This
possibility arises when an individual's personal life and sense of
honor are intertwined with their professional life.19 This is often
the case as individuals who are in a common profession or
business frequently spend considerable time together, either at
conferences or in other non-business settings. 160  Fair dealing is
particularly important in these situations, because failure to do so
results in social costs to the individual. 161
How relevant are repeat dealing, reputation, and informal
sanctions in the context of traditional healers? Speculatively,
these factors play an important role in ensuring that traditional
practitioners deliver a certain caliber of service. However, before
continuing, a brief digression is necessary. Some Western
practitioners might well ask what "quality services" really means.
Such skeptics might argue that as the effectiveness of most
traditional practices has never been scientifically proven, 162 it is
impossible to say what is, or is not, quality service. Although this
155 Wendel (2003), supra note 132, at 1576.
156 NORTH, supra note 112, at 37-38; Posner, supra note 142, at 27.
157 See, e.g., Curtis Milhaupt & Mark West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 50-51 (2000).
158 NORTH, supra note 112, at 38.
159 Bernstein, supra note 129, at 1749 (detailing how business reputation in the
American cotton industry affected status in the community).
160 Bernstein, supra note 129, at 1749; Chamy, supra note 147, at 393-94.
161 Charny, supra note 147, at 393-94.
162 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (regarding traditional medicine being
evidence-based).
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may be true, it is still possible to define some basic parameters as
to what constitutes quality service. Quality service should, at a
minimum, include (a) using treatments which the healer's
experience suggests will help the patient, (b) foregoing potentially
damaging forms of therapy, (c) informing patients when they think
their treatment is unlikely to be effective, and (d) referring patients
with medical conditions which are serious and only amenable to
Western medicines or surgery.
It seems safe to assume that the desire for repeat business
motivates traditional practitioners to do a good job. Literature
from Senegal, 163 South Africa, 64 India, 165 and China 166 confirms
that traditional practitioners also consider reputation and honor to
be important. The fact that traditional practitioners consider this
important will encourage a certain quality of service. There is also
some evidence that the threat of violence'67 or social ostracism
168
163 See Sekou Balde & Claude Sterck, Traditional Healers in Casamance, Senegal,
15 WORLD HEALTH FORUM 390, 390 (1994).
164 Andrew Maykuth, Traditional Healers Face a New World[In South Africa, That
Includes Insurance, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 1, 1997, at Al.
165 K.R. Srikanta Murthy, Professional Ethics in Ancient Indian Medicine, in CROSS
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS: READINGS 126, 128 (Robert M. Veatch
ed., 1989).
166 Ricong Peng, How Professional Values are Developed and Applied in Medical
Practice in China, 30 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S23 (2000); see also Tao Lee, Medical Ethics
in Ancient China, in CROSS CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS: READINGS 132,
132 (Robert M. Veatch ed., 1989).
167 See Ludsin, supra note 115, at 86 (according to Ludsin witch doctors and
sorcerers in South Africa might have their homes burnt or be killed, however,
the reason for this seems to be more often suspicion that the sorcerer caused an
illness, death or other misfortune, rather than the sorcerer's failure to cure); see
also A.J.G.M. Sanders, Towards the Legalization of African Folk Medicine, 7 MED. L.
523, 527 (1989) (discussing how witches and sorcerers themselves use violence).
This author was personally involved in a situation in Papua New Guinea where a
physiotherapist had to make a hasty retreat after an elderly man had a cardiac arrest
while undergoing chest physiotherapy. A surgeon returning from Mozambique told the
author that he had, at times, been forced to operate with a gun pointed at his head during
that country's civil war. If the threat exists for Western practitioners, it also likely exists
for traditional practitioners.
168 See Edward C. Green, Can Collaborative Programs Between Biomedical and
Indigenous Health Practitioners Succeed?, 27 Soc. SCI. MED. 1125, 1128 (1988)
(suggesting that African traditional practitioners see their standing in their community as
important to them).
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may also motivate traditional practitioners to provide quality
service. Whether or not such constraints are effective in
promoting the delivery of objectively high-quality healthcare is a
question that will be addressed after considering other forms of
constraints.
B. Norms
The next level of sophistication of informal constraints is
social norms. Richard McAdams defines norms as "informal
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because
of an internalized sense of duty, because of fear of external non-
legal sanctions, or both."'169 According to North, informal rules or
constraints, which include norms, are "socially transmitted
information and are a part of the heritage that we call culture."17
Ellickson found that social norms he studied in Shasta County,
California generally reduced transaction costs by providing a set
of mechanisms for quickly and cheaply dealing with situations that
could give rise to conflict.'T' For example, the most common
response to cattle trespass was to telephone the owner and tell
them that the cattle were somewhere they were not supposed to be.
The owner would then usually promptly come over, retrieve the
stray animal, and thank the individual concerned. 172 Those who
invoked formal legal rules instead of applying social norms were
considered deviants. 
173
Group norms are important and seem to arise spontaneously.
As one commentator suggests, "when men work together in the
same place, on the same terms, and with common work problems,
they will develop a set of standards and procedures by which to
judge and manage those problems, and they will discourage
deviation from those standards." 1
74
169 Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997).
170 NORTH, supra note 112, at 36-37.
171 See generally, ELLICKSON, supra note 124.
172 Id. at 53.
173 See id. at 60-64.
174 ELLIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
MEDICAL CARE 220 (1970); see also JOSEPH M. JACOB, DOCTORS AND RULES: A
SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONAL VALUES 123 (2d ed. 1988) (citing ELLIOT FREIDSON,
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Norms are undoubtedly of some relevance in the control of
traditional practitioners. W. Bradley Wendel has written about the
relative importance of norms versus legal rules in regulating the
behavior of lawyers in the United States. 75  Undoubtedly, norms
also play an important role in constraining physician behavior. 176
The literature on this subject is obscured by the fact that most of
the medical literature uses a different set of terminology. The
extensive literature on "professionalism" is ostensibly about such
norms.
77
In considering the effectiveness of norms, the question is not
just whether the norms constrain behavior, but whether those
norms constrain behavior in a way that encourages the provision
of quality services. In the context of norms within the Western
medical profession, it can be argued that the answer is generally
that the norms encourage the provision of quality services. This is
because the professionalism that the medical community chooses
to promote is, in essence, the subset of community norms which
lead to objectively beneficial outcomes for the patient. These
norms include the need to do the following: stay up to date; use
evidence-based medicine; refer patients when "you are in over
your head;" "always err on the side of safety;" and "do no
harm."
, 178
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE (1970)).
175 Wendel (2001), supra note 132; Wendel (2003), supra note 132.
176 See JACOB, supra note 174.
177 See, e.g., infra notes 194-97. According to this author, while "professionalism"
is first and foremost an informal code of conduct, this code has frequently been
formalized into rules that are enforced by third parties.
178 Medical Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter, 136
ANNALS INTERN. MED. 243, 243-46 (2002). The Charter on Medical Professionalism,
which was produced by the Medical Professionalism Project, ABIM Foundation, ACP-
ASIM Foundation, and European Federation of Internal Medicine, offers an alternate list
of professional responsibilities: (1) "Commitment to professional competence;" (2)
"Commitment to honesty with patients;" (3) "Commitment to patient confidentiality;"
(4) "Commitment to maintaining appropriate relations with patients;" (5) "Commitment
to improving quality of care;" (6) "Commitment to improving access to care;" (7)
"Commitment to a just distribution of finite resources;" (8) "Commitment to scientific
knowledge;" (9) "Commitment to maintaining trust by managing conflicts of interest;"
and (10) "Commitment to professional responsibilities." Id. As of May 2003, "[ninety]
professional associations, colleges, societies, and certifying boards [from numerous
countries] ha[d] endorsed the Charter .. " Linda Blank et al., Medical Professionalism
in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter 15 Months Later, 138 ANNALS INTERN.
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Although norms within the medical profession are, in general,
socially desirable, there is some question as to whether such norms
would have arisen absent government involvement or the threat of
government intervention. Given the long history of government
involvement in the regulatory process, teasing apart whether
existing norms originated within the medical profession itself or
whether the norms are attributable to past government intervention
may be impossible.
Norms also play a role in traditional medicine. The extent of
the development of such norms will likely depend on a number of
factors. These factors may include: whether there is a coherent
school of practice of traditional medicine (as there is for example
with Auyervedic Medicine), whether training takes place in a
school or by apprenticeship, the existence of voluntary or
mandatory associations of practitioners, and the degree of
interactions between practitioners. It is hard to say how important
norms are in determining the quality of care delivered by
traditional practitioners. Today's body of literature relates more to
professional ethics than to norms.
Certainly, ethical codes of practice are important to traditional
practitioners schooled in the well-established forms of traditional
medicine practiced in south and southeast Asia. Practitioners of
Ayurvedic medicine traditionally were required to take an oath
containing provisions similar to the ethical obligations contained
within the Hippocratic oath. 79 Likewise, professional ethics have
historically played an important role in the practice of traditional
Chinese medicine. 8 ' Many of the ancient codes of conduct
express similar principles to those that have been traditionally
valued in the Western medical community."'
Once again, the question is whether the norms within the
MED. 839, 840 (2003).
179 See Murthy, supra note 165, at 128 (discussing ethics in ancient Indian
medicine). One such oath, the Atreya Anushasana, predates the Hippocratic oath by two
centuries. Id.
180 Lee, supra note 166; Peng, supra note 166.
181 See, e.g., Sun Ssu-miao, The Thousand Golden Remedies, in Lee, supra note
166, at 132 (discussing medical ethics in ancient China); Chang Kao, The Medical Talks,
in Lee, supra note 166, at 166; Chen Shih-kung, An Orthodox Manual of Surgery, in
Lee, supra note 166, at 13 n.6 (listing the five commandments and ten requirements for
physicians).
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community of traditional healers lead to objectively beneficial
outcomes. This is something that will vary from place to place.
Perhaps the relative scarcity of literature relating to adverse effects
arising from the practice of traditional medicine in south and
southeast Asia is due, at least in part, to the fact that practice
norms in these countries have been positively influenced by the
well-developed ethical codes that exist within these schools of
medicine.
C. Self-Imposed Restraints-Personal Standards/Ethics
Self-imposed regulations, such as personal standards or ethics,
are some of the most important forms of behavioral constraint.
Ellickson cites a work by Georg Simmel from 1902 which states:
[i]n the morality of the individual, society creates for itself an
organ which is not only more fundamentally operative than law
and custom, but which also spares society the different sorts of
cost involved in these institutions. Hence the tendency of
society to satisfy its demands as cheaply as possible results in
appeals to "good conscience," through which the individual pays
to himself the wages of his righteousness, which otherwise
would probably have to be assured to him in some way through
law or custom.18
2
Where self-imposed constraints come from and why they are more
effective in controlling the behavior of some people rather than
others are fundamental questions in the fields of psychology,
sociology, criminology, philosophy, and anthropology, among
others. Although thoroughly canvassing this issue is clearly
beyond the scope of this paper, some consideration of this form of
constraint is necessary. "Internalized standards of personal
conduct"'183 play an important role in constraining the behavior of
Western medical practitioners,'84 as well as other professional
182 ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 245 (citing Georg Simmel, The Number of
Members as Determining the Sociological Form of the Group, 8 AM. J. Soc. 1, 19
(1902)).
183 Wendel (2001), supra note 132, at 1960.
184 See generally CHANGING AND LEARNING IN THE LIVES OF PHYSICIANS 80 (Robert
D. Fox et al. eds., 1989) (addressing the issue as to what motivates doctors to change
their practices); Hans Asbjorn Holm, Quality Issues in Continuing Medical Education,
316 (7131) BMJ 621, 621 (1998) (discussing what motivates doctors in the context of
continuing medial education); PHIL R. MANNING & Lois DEBAKEY, MEDICINE:
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groups, such as lawyers, 85 and are also likely an important factor
in constraining the behavior of traditional practitioners as well.
The Fox study illustrated the importance of self-imposed
standards in constraining the behavior of physicians was. 18 6 The
authors of the study interviewed 356 doctors in the United States
and Canada and asked them about recent changes in their practice
and what had been the impetus for change.'87 "The largest single
impetus of changes was primarily driven by the desire for a sense
of competence or excellence."'' 88  Among that group of 184
changes, the "desire to do 'one's best' was described.., as the
primary cause for making changes."'' 89 In contrast, only twenty-
six changes were attributable to fear of liability.1 90
Obviously, the content of internalized codes of conduct varies
from one person to another. However, that being said, norms are
still important because people, to varying degrees, internalize
those norms.' 9' The process of internalizing norms is actively
encouraged by various institutions in our society. Most notable
among these institutions are schools, which take a key role in
inculcating norms.192 The process of compelling people to accept
professional norms begins in professional schools.' 93
Although the educational process that doctors go through in
Western countries is undoubtedly essential in inculcating
PRESERVING THE PASSION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1987) (discussing what motivates
doctors in the context of continuing medial education).
185 Wendel (2001), supra note 132, at 1960.
186 CHANGING AND LEARNING IN THE LIVES OF PHYSICIANS, supra note 184.
187 See Id. at 2-5.
188 Id. at 80.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 138. Note, however, that this study is somewhat dated. See contra David
M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J.A.M.A. 2609, 2609 (2005) (suggesting that a
fear of litigation has resulted in a large percentage of physicians practicing defensive
medicine).
191 ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 282; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 922 (1996) (discussing how people internalize social
norms about the role they play).
192 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
974 (1995) (dealing with the role of schools in the construction of social meaning).
193 See Wendel (2001), supra note 132, at 1986.
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professional norms,194 norms can not be simply learned in the
classroom. The attitudes, values, beliefs, modes of thought, and
behavior of medical students are largely influenced by the culture
of the academic learning centers or teaching hospitals. 1
95
Numerous articles have referred to the importance of role models
in instilling professional values. 196 According to one observer, the
role of mentoring young doctors involves an "integration of that
person into the existing community through socialization of its
norms and expectations."'' 97 One question to consider is: are
internal constraints also important in controlling the behavior of
traditional practitioners? It would seem likely that they are, since
such constraints influence most people in most societies. The
more relevant question, however, is whether these internalized
norms of conduct are of such a nature that they constrain the
behavior of traditional practitioners in a way that leads to
objectively desirable outcomes.
D. Third Party Informal Enforcement, Networks, and Other
Trade Intermediaries
Historically, in the absence of formal rules networks, trade
associations and other intermediaries have arisen as another level
of private ordering. Examples of these intermediaries range from
trade associations of footwear manufacturers in Mexico 198 and
194 Most medical schools, at least most of those in the United States, incorporate
formal instruction on professionalism in the curriculum. Herbert M. Swick et al.,
Teaching Professionalism in Undergraduate Medical Education, 282 J.A.M.A. 830, 830
(1999).
195 See Kenneth M. Ludmerer, Instilling Professionalism in Medical Education, 282
J.A.M.A. 881, 882 (1999); Preston Reynolds, Reaffirming Professionalism through the
Education Community, 120 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 609, 609 (1994).
196 See, e.g., Scott M. Wright, et al., Attributes of Excellent Attending-Physician
Role Models, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1986, 1991 (1998) (discussing the characteristics
of physicians who serve as good role model); Preston Reynolds, Reaffirming
Professionalism through the Education Community, 120 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 609, 612
(1994) (considering the role of the educational community in transmitting
professional values); Scott M. Wright & Joseph A. Carrese, Excellence in Role
Modeling: Insight and Perspectives from the Pros, 167 C.M.A.J. 638, 638 (2002)
(looking at what qualities make a physician a good role model).
197 Reynolds, supra note 196, at 611.
198 Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement and Trade Liberalization in
Mexico's Footwear Industry, 26 WORLD DEV. 979, 979 (1998).
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Taiwan,'99 to fur dressers associations in the United States, 200 to
the medieval Maghribi traders coalition,20 1 and trader coalitions in
Mexican California in the mid 1800s. 2 °2 These groups have
historically provided a useful means of solving collective action
problems and have been useful in enforcing trade rules in the
absence of an effective third-party enforcer. 3  It has been
suggested that such networks may be superior to courts in
enforcing norms because: (a) they can more efficiently monitor
their members 2 4 and spread information about reputation; 205 (b)
their information is more readily accepted because it is seen as
unbiased;20 6 (c) the threat of exclusion from the network, 20 7 or the
threat of social sanctions208 provides a ready and effective means
of sanction; and (d) rule making and enforcement by such groups
may be more nuanced than if it were done by the government.2 9
E. Third-Party Enforcement: Government
In most instances, it is easier and cheaper to invoke informal
rules than it is to use the formal legal system. However, these
informal mechanisms of control are rudimentary210 and never
completely successful, so third party enforcement is necessary.211
In developed countries, the formal rule system never completely
199 You-tien Hsing, Trading Companies in Taiwan's Fashion Shoe Networks, 48 J.
INT'LECON. 101, 101 (1998).
200 McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140, at 2441.
201 Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 525 (1993).
202 Karen Clay, Trade Without Law: Private-Order Institutions in Mexican
California, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202, 202 (1997).
203 McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140, at 2423.
204 Aviram, supra note 150, at 10-11.
205 McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 140, at 2423, 2427-29
206 Aviram, supra note 150, at 11.
207 Id. at 13; see Aviram, supra note 133, at 1227.
208 Aviram, supra note 133, at 1225.
209 Ellen Katz, Private Order and Public Institutions: Comments on McMillan and
Woodruff's 'Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order', 98 MICH. L. REV. 2481,
2482 (2000).
210 Posner, supra note 134, at 221.
211 See NORTH, supra note 133, at 35.
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replaces the informal system; rather, the informal rules lie "in the
shadow of the law, 2t 2 and the possibility of legal action
encourages conformity to cheaper forms of regulation.213
The government can often be the best candidate for acting as a
third party enforcer. 14 It has a monopoly over the legal use of
force as a coercive tactic and is in a unique position in that it alone
can impose sanctions such as jail terms.2 15 Economies of scale
may also make the government the least costly enforcer.1 6
The discussion of the role of government as a third-party
enforcer follows. Tort law, contract law, and criminal law are
other institutions that the government can use to constrain
behavior.
F. Choice of Regulator: Do Informal Sanctions Work in the
Case of Traditional Medicine?
People will generally choose the lowest cost regulator, which
means choosing informal control mechanisms. For example,
where there is repeat dealing, or the possibility of lock-in,
agreements tend to become self-enforcing. Additionally, in a
small community, information can be readily shared and informal
mechanisms can also be effective. Ellickson suggests that
informal control also works better where there is "reciprocal
power, ready sanctioning opportunities, and adequate
information .... ,,27  He further suggests that both the size and
degree of technicality of the dispute are important.218 Size matters
in that only larger disputes warrant the higher costs that arise from
using the formal legal system.
However, under certain circumstances, formal constraints may
be preferable. Because informal sanctions work better where there
is either repeat dealing, or in a small community where
information can be readily shared, one might speculate that
212 Aviram, supra note 133, at 1191.
213 Seeid. at 1191 n.33.
214 See id. at 1188.
215 Id.
216 See NORTH, supra note 112, at 58.
217 ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 181.
218 See id. at 257.
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informal mechanisms are likely to work better in smaller
communities than in large ones.
There is, however, a fundamental obstacle which prevents
these informal mechanisms from achieving a utility-maximizing
outcome. The problem is, once again, imperfect information. A
poor African mother whose child has gastroenteritis and dies from
dehydration after being given bad advice by a traditional
practitioner may be more likely to blame the death on the child
being sickly, or to an exceptionally strong curse, rather than to
think of it as a medical failure. The problem is that the consumer
has incomplete information. He or she does not recognize the
practitioner's inadequacies and therefore the possibility of using
informal mechanisms, such as loss of prospective advantage
(repeat dealings), loss of reputation, social ostracism, and the
threat of violence, simply does not arise.
Lack of reciprocal power may also impede the functioning of
informal mechanisms. At least in some communities, people fear
the power of traditional healers. In many places in Africa21 9 and in
Melanesian countries,"' people fear that such practitioners might
poison them. People might therefore be loath to use any form of
sanctions or to even spread negative gossip about the practitioner.
This is a further barrier to the use of informal sanctions.
Norms within the medical profession play an important and
positive role in constraining the behavior of physicians. Could it
be that norms in the traditional healer community also play an
important role in achieving beneficial outcomes? Evidence from
clinical studies presented earlier suggests that in many parts of the
world the answer is no1 Consider, for example, the situation in
countries where traditional practitioners do not refer patients when
they have medically treatable conditions and, as a result, patients
die. Within the normative environment of the Western medical
219 See Kenneth Leonard, Research Page, African Traditional Healers: Are They as
Good at Economics as They Are at Medicine?, at 4-5 (Feb. 2001), http://www.arec.
umd.edu/kleonard/papers/trhl-pd-pr.pdf (discussing traditional healers using poisoning
to ensure payment).
220 From this author's experience in Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, poisoning was
reputed to be widely used in traditional Melanesian society in order to kill your enemies.
Unexplained deaths were often attributed to poisoning.
221 See supra Parts III.A-C.
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community, this is considered a travesty.2 2 2 Such deaths arise
because the healer either has inadequate knowledge or refuses to
ask for help when he or she is in over his or her head, or when the
traditional healer does not care about the welfare of the patient.
According to the norms of Western medicine, a death that arises
from any of those reasons constitutes a breach of professional
responsibility. 3 If the community of traditional healers were to
have a developed set of socially desirable norms on par with the
Western medical community, failing to refer medically treatable
patients would not happen with the frequency that it does.
Ellickson refers to "social imperfections," which are
"analogous to market imperfections. '2 2 4  These social
imperfections may lead to people being less likely to "engage in
objectively beneficial social exchange. ' 25 It can be argued that, in
some parts of the world, there are numerous social imperfections
that result in dysfunctional informal mechanisms of control of
traditional practitioners. The fact that informal constraints do not
work well is an important reason for advocating the use of
regulations.
VI. Formal Constraints: Regulation
Since informal sanctions have proven ineffective in ensuring a
wealth maximizing outcome or a high quality of service, the
regulation of traditional practitioners may be justified. The next
question that arises is whether regulations actually work.
Unfortunately there appears to be little, if any, research addressing
this question. Absent empirical data or even anecdotal literature
on the subject, what can one usefully say about such regulation?
First, the history of the regulation of doctors in many parts of the
world suggests that such regulation has primarily advanced the
interests of the medical profession rather than the population at
large. Second, the rule of law is weak in developing countries,
222 See, e.g., Green, supra note 168, at 1126.
223 This author posits that perhaps a significant part of the animosity that Western
practitioners feel is not related to economic competition, or different world views, as
Green suggests, but rather due to the perception that the traditional practitioner who
cause harm are acting in an immoral fashion. Id.
224 ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 181.
225 Id.
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and this presents a further impediment to effective regulation.
Third, the holistic and spiritual nature of traditional medicine may
render conventional regulation problematic.
A. The History of the Regulation of Doctors: A Story of Self
Interest?
According to many, the history of medical boards in the
United States is overwhelmingly the story of the medical
profession acting in order to further its own interests rather than
acting to protect the public interest.226 Those who hold this view
assert that medical boards in the United States originated in the
19th century when the medical profession was under siege.227
During this period, physicians appealed to state governments to
limit the supply of physicians. 8 The states responded by forming
medical boards that allowed the physicians to assume a gate-
keeping function whereby they could exclude others from working
in medical care.229
The validity of the interest group theory is supported by
statistics that show that until the 1980s, medical boards in the
United States disciplined physicians exceedingly infrequently.23 °
From 1963 to 1967, American "boards [only] prosecuted a total of
seven cases of incompetence., 231 American medical boards only
began to get serious about "discipline [of doctors] in the 1970s and
1980s.,,232 From 1986 to 1996, 1,677 cases were prosecuted for
incompetence, 233 and in 1996, "2,675 'serious' disciplinary
226 See, e.g., CARL F. AMERINGER, STATE MEDICAL BOARDS AND THE POLITICS OF
PUBLIC PROTECTION 1 (1999) (concerning the history of state medical boards). But see
ROBERT DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES xi-xiii
(1969) (providing a more positive view of why medical licensing arose).
227 AMERINGER, supra note 226, at 7.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See Richard J. Feinstein, Special Report: The Ethics of Professional Regulation,
312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 801,801-02 (1985).
231 AMERINGER, supra note 226, at 6.
232 Id. at 5.
233 Id. at 6 (citing SIDNEY WOLFE ET AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP,
QUESTIONABLE DOCTORS 23 (1993)).
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actions" were brought against doctors.234 Still, according to the
Public Citizens Health Research Group, 235 American boards were
not, as of 1993, doing an adequate job of protecting the American
public. 36
Although a thorough analysis of the history of regulation of
doctors in other developed countries is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is worth noting that the experience of the United States
seems typical of developed countries. For example, it has been
suggested that the early legislation regulating the practice of
medicine in Holland was a way of formally establishing a
monopoly for certain types of practitioners and for excluding
competitors.237 Similarly, statistics from the United Kingdom
show that prior to 1996, few complaints regarding the quality of
service gave rise to disciplinary actions by the Family Health
Service Authorities Service Committee.2 38 Dissatisfaction with the
medical profession in the United Kingdom parallels the American
experience as evidenced by statistics showing a sharp rise in the
number of complaints during the late 1980s and early 1990S. 239
Some commentators have suggested that the licensing of CAM
practitioners in the United States has also largely been driven by
professional self-interest. Like doctors, CAM practitioners have
been accused of using licensing as a barrier to competition.24 °
CAM providers may also actively seek regulation as it lends an
aura of legitimacy, to their particular area of practice, a legitimacy
which may allow practitioners to charge more for their services or
234 Id. (citing WOLFE ET AL., supra note 233, at 13).
235 Id.
236 See Timothy Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation,
Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 825, 863 (1995) (arguing that boards
rarely prosecute because doctors are reluctant to sanction other doctors).
237 R.M.J. Schepers & H.E.G.M. Hermans, The Medical Profession and Alternative
Medicine in the Netherlands: Its History and Recent Developments, 48 Soc. SCI. & MED.
343, 344-45 (1999).
238 Will Bartlett, The Regulation of General Practice in the UK, 11 INT'L J. HEALTH
PLAN. & MGMT 3, 10-11 (1996).
239 Id. at 10.
240 See Peter J. Van Hemel, A Way Out of the Maze: Federal Agency Preemption of
State Licensing and Regulation of Complementary and Alternative Medicine
Practitioners, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 329, 332 (2001).
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allow them to receive payment from insurers.24" '
If health practitioner self-regulation has been self-serving, it is
not entirely surprising. It has been alleged that those who are self-
regulating typically do not serve the public interest as they
should,242 and that self-regulating agencies generally have a poor
record of enforcement.243  The traditional belief is that
governments regulate in order to further the public good.2' The
first serious challenge to this theory began in the 1970s,24 5 with the
development of theories that postulated that regulations arise
either as the result of different groups competing for power
(interest group theory) or the result of individuals acting to
maximize their own welfare (private interest theory). 246 Though it
may seem somewhat cynical, safeguarding the public interest is
seldom a major factor either in the development or implementation
of regulatory frameworks.
B. An Added Problem in Developing Countries-The Rule of
Law is Weak
The history of regulation of physicians in developed countries
is of some relevance to the question of regulating traditional
practitioners in such countries. But it is an imperfect model. One
of the biggest differences between developed and developing
countries is that the rule of law in developing countries is
generally weak. This weakness further undermines the prospects
of successful regulation.
According to the World Bank, the deficiencies in the legal
241 See id. at 332-33.
242 BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 97, at 129.
243 Ross CRANSTON, CONSUMERS AND THE LAW 62 (Robert Stevens et al. eds., 2nd
ed. 1984) (1978); see also Anthony Ogus, Rethinking Self-Regulation, 15 O.J.L.S. 97,
98-99 (1995).
244 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON.
& MGMT. Sci. 3, 3 (1971); George Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the
"Theories of Regulation" Debate, 36 J.L. & EcON. 289, 289-90 (1993).
245 See Priest, supra note 244, at 289; see also NORTH, supra note 112, at 48 ("[A]s
a first approximation[,] rules are derived from self interest."). See generally Richard A.
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974)
(providing a challenge to the belief that governments regulate to promote the public
good).
246 See supra text accompanying notes 210-28.
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systems of developing countries can be divided into five
categories. 247  First, laws and regulations that are enacted or
promulgated are often not published, and if so, are not widely
accessible or intelligible to the public. 48 Second, laws and
regulations are often changed and are therefore considered
unstable.249 Third, laws that are enacted may not be enforced.25 °
Fourth, the laws that are adopted are often inefficient as a result of
the lack of public participation and scrutiny.25  Finally, there is
inadequate attention devoted to designing public administration
systems that will ensure that the laws are completely and
efficiently administered.252
Many of the problems of law enforcement in developing
countries may simply be attributed to inadequate resources. A
lack of resources in the judiciary, the Attorney General's office, or
the police department will undermine a country's ability to enforce
laws. Similarly, budgetary constraints in the health department
hamper the implementation of health regulations.253 In developing
countries there are often not enough public health inspectors to
visit workplaces and food outlets, or to effectively monitor for
breach of regulations. 4
A lack of resources may also affect the judiciary and as a
result, the judiciary may be ineffective. 255 This affects all aspects
247 World Bank, Governance and Development at 30 (1992).
248 Id.
249 Id. at 32.
250 Id. at 35.
251 Id. at 35-38.
252 Id. at 38-39.
253 Charles Hongoro & Lilani Kumaranayake, Do They Work? Regulating for Profit
Providers in Zimbabwe, 15(4) HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 368, 375 (2000); see also Ngoyi
Bukonda et al., Implementing a National Hospital Accreditation Program: the Zambian
Experience, 14 (Supplement 1) INT'L J. QUALITY HEALTH CARE 7, 14-15 (2002)
(describing how a Zambian hospital accreditation program stalled due to lack of funding)
254 WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000-HEALTH
SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE, at 121 [hereinafter WHO, 2000].
255 See World Bank, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997: THE STATE IN A
CHANGING WORLD, at 36 (1997) ("[u]nfortunately [a well functioning judiciary] seems to
be the exception rather than the rule"); see also Michael Trebilcock, What Makes Poor
Countries Poor?: The Role of Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in 3 THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 15, 40 (Buscaglia, E. et al. eds., 1997) (noting
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of law enforcement as "a well functioning judiciary is a central
pillar of the rule of law. 256 This is in part because an effective
judiciary constitutes the primary constraint on the other arms of
government (the legislature, administration, the executive, and the
police). Such a constraint may be necessary in order to prevent
the other great impediment to regulation: corruption. The sad
reality in many countries is that employees of the state not only
fail to enforce the rules, they actively break them, or use the rules
for their own private gain.
Statistics on the percentage of firms reporting having to pay
bribes provide some indication of the extent of the corruption
problem. 257 These rates range from 43.1% in Central and Eastern
Europe to 74.2% in South Asia.25 8 Transparency International in
its annual Corruptions Perception Index found seven out of ten
countries scored 5/10 or less on their index. 25 9 Also, 4% of all
countries scored less than three, indicating a high level of
260
corruption.
Corruption affecting the law creating and enforcing branches
of government constitutes a particularly troubling obstacle to
effective law enforcement. In many countries such corruption is
rampant. For example, in Kenya, 86% of those who dealt with the
Attorney General's office reported having to pay bribes.26'
Corrupt police forces are also a problem.262 In Kenya 81.6% of
that a deficiency in resources affects the legal systems in developing countries).
256 World Bank, supra note 255, at 36.
257 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, A BETTER INVESTMENT
CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 40 (2005).
258 Id.
259 Press Release, Transparency International, Transperancy International
Corruption Perceptions Index 2003: Nine Out of Ten Developing Countries Urgently
Need Practical Support to Fight Corruptions, Highlights New Index (Oct. 7, 2003),
http://www.transparency.org (follow "Corruption Perceptions Index" hyperlink; then
follow "2003" hyperlink; then follow "2003 press release" hyperlink).
260 Id.
261 Transparency International, The Kenya Urban Bribery Index 2001: Corruption
in Kenya: Findings of an Urban Bribery Survey, at 10 (2001) available at
www.transparency.org (follow "bribe payers index" hyperlink; then follow "Africa &
Middle East" hyperlink).
262 See, e.g., Simon Coldham, Legal Responses to State Corruption in
Commonwealth Africa, 39 J.AFR. L. 115, 121 (1995).
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people reported paying bribes as being a part of their interaction
with the police. 63 In a Transparency International survey, over
30% of respondents in a number of countries, including Mexico,
Malaysia, and Nigeria, indicated they thought corruption in the
countries' police force was the countries single most worrisome
form of corruption. 64 In 1993, a Philippine non-governmental
organization (NGO) estimated that half of all crimes committed in
the country involved the participation of a policeman.265
Numerous surveys and articles indicate that health services are
not immune to corruption.266 In Eastern Europe, Central Asia,267
268and Africa, patients are frequently forced to pay bribes. A study
from Latin America likewise found widespread corruption in
public hospitals. 269 There is ample reason to expect that in some
countries, corrupt officials might exploit any opportunity created
by the regulatory process.
263 Transparency International, The Kenya Bribery Index 2005, at 10 (2005),
available at http://www.transparency.org (follow "bribe payers index" hyperlink; then
follow "Africa & Middle East" hyperlink).
264 Transparency International, The Global Corruption Barometer Survey 2003, at
31 (2005), http://www.transpearancy.org (follow "global corruption barometer"
hyperlink; then follow "2003" hyperlink).
265 JAN WILLEM BAKKER, THE PHILIPPINE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE INDEPENDENCE AND
IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM 1986 TILL 1997 44 (Centre for
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers 1997).
266 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004: MAKING SERVICES
WORK FOR POOR PEOPLE 24 (2003); Wim Van Lerberghe, et al., When Staff is
Underpaid: Dealing with the Individual Coping Strategies of Health Personnel, 80
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 581 (2002) (examining the coping strategies of health
worker's in response to inadequate salaries).
267 WORLD BANK, MAKING TRANSITIONS WORK FOR EVERYONE: POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY IN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 258 (2000).
268 Daniel Levy-Bruhl et al., The Bamako Initiative in Benin and Guinea: Improving
the Effectiveness of Primary Health Care, 12 INT'L J. HEALTH PLAN. & MGMT. S49
(Supp. 1997); DEEPA NARAYAN ET AL., CRYING OUT FOR CHANGE: VOICES OF THE POOR
103-05 (2000); Hongoro & Kumaranayake, supra note 253 (regarding corruption in the
Zimbabwe medical private sector)
269 See RAPHAEL DITELLA & WILLIAM SAVEDOFF, DIAGNOSIS CORRUPTION: FRAUD
IN LATIN AMERICA'S PUBLIC HOSPITALS (Inter-American Development Bank 2001).
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C. The Experience of Developing Countries in Regulating
Doctors
The regulation of doctors is presumably the model for
regulating traditional practitioners. What is the experience of
developing countries in regulating doctors? Although there is
scant literature on the subject, what literature exists is consistent
with our knowledge of medical boards in developed countries and
the general difficulty in enforcing the rule of law in developing
countries.27 °
In India, pursuant to the Indian Medical Council Act, the
practice of allopathic medicine is regulated by the central
government, as well as by the states." 1 State Medical Councils
(SMCs) are supposed to maintain a register of providers.272 These
councils are reportedly under-funded, and as a result, some
elections to the councils have been postponed for years. 3
Additionally, there have been "irregularities" in the elections.274
Furthermore, these councils are said to be vulnerable to political
pressure.275
In India, people appear to lack confidence in the ability of
SMCs to enforce standards of care.276 Anecdotal evidence would
270 See generally Sara Bennett et al., Carrot and Stick: State Mechanisms to
Influence Private Provider Behaviour, 9 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 1 (1994) (discussing
some of the difficulties encountered in trying to regulate private healthcare providers in
developing countries); Lilani Kumaranayake, The Role of Regulation: Influencing
Private Sector Activity within Health Sector Reform, 9 J. INT'L DEV. 641 (1997)
(discussing how regulations aimed at the private health sector in developing countries
have a low rate of enforcement); see also Tim Ensor & Sabine Weinzierl, A Review of
Regulation in the Health Sector of Low and Middle Income Countries (Oxford Policy
and Management, Working Paper, 2006), available at http://www.opml.co.ukldocsl
HealthSector RegulationWorkingPaper Jan_2006.pdf (reviewing the current
literature on health sector regulation in low and middle income countries).
271 See, e.g., Indian Medical Council Act No. 102 of 1956 (1956), available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm=1956102; see also, e.g., Karnataka Medical
Registration Act, No. 34 of 1961 (1961), available at http://dpal.kar.nic.in/
pdf files%5CMEDICAL%20REGISTRATION.pdf.
272 Bhat, supra note 63, at 269-270.
273 Id. at 269-70.
274 Id. at 270.
275 Id.
276 Yesudian, supra note 76, at 78.
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seem to support such skepticism. Dr. Ramesh Bhat held "informal
discussions" with one member of a council and was told that "not
many councils have suspended the registration of any member,
even though many complaints are received by the council. In the
case of one council, inquiry was initiated in only three cases and,
in those, no disciplinary action has been taken."2 1' The Registrar
of the Andhra Pradesh Medical Council also reportedly stated that
they hear only thirty-five to forty cases of professional misconduct
in a given year.278 Of these, the majority are complaints related to
the issuance of medical certificates.279
Indeed, it seems that many of the laws related to healthcare in
India are seldom enforced. Despite the existence of the Bombay
Nursing Home Act of 1949, which requires the registration of
private hospitals and nursing homes, over 100 nursing homes in
that city were, as of 1992, not registered. 280 The local government
also failed to formulate any standards for such hospitals/homes
despite being required to do so under the Act.28' In Delhi, which
has similar legislation, only 130 of approximately 1200 nursing
homes were registered.282 Likewise, although empowered to do so
under the Act, officials in Bombay admitted that inspection of
nursing homes is rare, and in some wards no nursing homes had
been visited for years.283
The situation in other poor countries appears to be similar to
that in India. Bennett and Ngalande-Banda 284 have reported that
enforcement of professional regulation is weak or absent in Sub-
277 Bhat, supra note 63 at 270.
278 Alex George, Updates and Assessment of Current GoAp Laws, Capacities and
Activities to Regulate Private Health Care Providers 15 (unpublished DFID document,
on file with the Centre for Health and Social Sector Studies).
279 Id. Most often an employer questions whether certificates are legitimate or
issued after receiving a bribe. Letter from Dr. Alex George, Director, Centre for Health
and Social Sector Studies (July 2004) (on file with author).
280 Yesudian, supra note 76, at 77.
281 Id.
282 Bhat, supra note 63, at 271.
283 Id. at 272.
284 Sara Bennett & Ellias Ngalande-Banda, Public and Private Roles in Health: A
Review and Analysis of Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, at 34-36 (Mar. 1994),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1 997/WHOARACC_97.6.pdf.
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Saharan Africa.285 The Zimbabwean Health Professions Council
(HPC), for example, reportedly suffers from a number of
shortcomings.2 86  According to Dorothy Mutizwa-Mangiza, the
council has, for political reasons, been forced to register doctors
that it considered unsuitable,2 87 including foreign-trained doctors
who are unable to speak English. 88 Effective discipline in that
country reportedly suffers from a lack of clarity as to what
constitutes improper conduct.289 Furthermore, the public is poorly
informed as to the existence of the HPC or how to lodge a
complaint. 29 ° When complaints are made, few are ever referred to
the Disciplinary Committee-reportedly only three cases one
291 and2feyear 9'-and fewer yet result in discipline.92 In the years between
independence and 1999, only one medical practitioner was struck
off the register.293
Given such statistics it is not surprising that a survey of public
and private stakeholders in the Zimbabwean healthcare system
found that most people believed that health laws were not being
enforced.294 Stakeholders attributed the ineffective functioning of
the HPC to a number of factors. Not surprisingly, these factors
included inadequate recourses 295 and regulatory capture. 296
Thailand has also had problems regulating doctors. To begin
with, the Medical Council of Thailand receives few complaints
related to substandard care; between 1995 and 1999 there were a
285 Id.
286 DOROTHY MUTIZWA-MANGIZA, DOCTORS AND THE STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
PROFESSIONAL CONTROL IN ZIMBABWE 8 (Abebe Zegeye & John Higginson eds., 1999);
Hongoro & Kumaranayake, supra note 253.
287 MUTIZWA-MANGIZA, supra note 286, at 191; Hongoro & Kurnaranayake, supra
note 253, at 375.
288 MUTIZWA-MANGIZA, supra note 286, at 191.
289 Id. at 197.
290 Id. at 199.
291 Id. at 202.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 199.
294 Hongoro & Kumaranayake, supra note 253, at 373.
295 Id. at 375-76.
296 Id. at 376.
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total of 206 cases.2 97 When a complaint is received, it is slow to be
processed.298  Finally when a doctor is found guilty, the
punishment is said to be "mild., 299 Between 1995 and 1999, less
than 1% of doctors who were found guilty had their licenses
revoked (although 22% had their licenses suspended).300
D. The Experience of Developing Countries in Regulating
Traditional Practitioners
There is even less literature on the subject of the regulation of
traditional practitioners than there is on the regulation of doctors in
developing countries. Most countries have, at least on paper,
instituted licensing schemes for traditional practitioners. °1 India,
for example, has developed regulatory regimes for their systems of
traditional medicine.30 2 The Ayurveda, Unani, and Siddha systems
of medicine are all recognized by the Government of India
pursuant to the Central Council of Indian Medicine Central
Council Act of 1970.303 There is also state-level licensure. °4
Despite the extensive formal recognition and regulation of Indian
traditional medical systems, it is difficult to find any articles
critically analyzing how well this regulatory structure has worked.
E. The Problem of Standards
Another problem inherent in the use of regulation of doctors as
a model for traditional practitioners stems from the fact that
standards of education and practice are much harder to identify for
traditional practitioners then they are for doctors. Whereas formal
297 Yot Teerawattananon et al., Health Sector Regulation in Thailand: Recent
Progress and the Future Agenda, 63 HEALTH POL'Y 323, 330 (2003).
298 Id. at 330.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 WHO (2001), supra note 1.
302 Id. at 132.
303 Id.
304 See, e.g., The Karnataka Ayurveda & Unani Practitioner's Registration &
Medical Practitioners Miscellaneous Provisions Act, No. 9 of 1962, available at
http://www.karnataka.gov.in/dpal/pdffiles/AYURVEDC%20AND%20UN
ANI%20PRACTITIONERS-new-1 I.pdf.
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training programs exist in places like China, Korea, and India, in
other parts of the world there is no set curriculum for traditional
medicine. For example, most African countries have no "official"
schools teaching traditional medicine.
Although the lack of formal education is a legitimate concern,
evidence of having completed an apprenticeship with an
established or eventually a licensed traditional practitioner could
be used as an alternative to a schooling requirement. Another
approach could be to require a traditional practitioner to complete
a course offered by the Ministry of Health before they could be
licensed. This would afford the Ministry an opportunity to
provide instruction about basic hygiene, prevention of
transmission of blood-borne diseases, and the identification of
medically treatable diseases.
Defining the scope of practice of traditional practitioners may
also be a problem. Traditional practitioners in many places,
including Botswana,3"' Mozambique," 6  Ethiopia," 7  Brazil,3"8
Indonesia,309Papua New Guinea," ° and Samoa,3 ' believe that
illness arises in the spirit world, or through acts of sorcery."'
Additionally, in many places people visit traditional practitioners
305 See Liv Haram, Tswana Medicine in Interaction with Biomedicine, 33 Soc. So.
& MED. 167, 168-71 (1991) (discussing the interaction of traditional and western belief
in Botswana).
306 See Victor Igreja, "Why Are there So Many Drums Playing Until Dawn?"
Exploring the Role of Gamba Spirits and Healers in Post-War Recovery Period in
Gorongosa, Central Mozambique, 40 TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 459, 465-66 (2003)
(discussing how the war in Mozambique affected traditional medical practices).
307 Makonnen Bishaw, Promoting Traditional Medicine in Ethiopia: A Brief
Historical Review of Government Policy, 33 SOC. SCL MED. 193, 193-94 (1991)
(examining the nature of traditional medicine in Ethiopia).
308 See Pollock supra note 115, at 151.
309 See Pam Gaines, A Visit with the Revered Dukuns of Indonesia, 102 AM. J.
NURSING 69, 69-71 (2002) (relating the authors personal experience with traditional
healers in Indonesia).
310 See Maria Lepowsky, Sorcery and Penicillin: Treating Illness on a Papua New
Guinea Island, 30 Soc. Sc. & MED. 1049, 1049 (1990).
311 See W. ARTHUR WHISTLER, SAMOAN HERBAL MEDICINE 6-11 (1996); W.
ARTHUR WHISTLER, POLYNESIAN HERBAL MEDICINE 16-17(1992).
312 Haram, supra note 305, at 172-73.
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for non-health related reasons:" 3 to try and improve their
performance on exams, 31 4 to make a business prosper,31 5 or to fix
marital or other family-related problems.316 These reasons for
visiting a traditional practitioner make setting standards of care
somewhat difficult.3"7 A similar concern also arises in the context
of CAM in developed countries. Since the vast majority of CAM
practices have not been scientifically proven as beneficial, there is
no reason to choose one form of treatment over another as the
standard. What standards can, for example, be set for the use of
therapeutic touch?318
Part of the solution to this dilemma may be for regulators to
concentrate on what practitioners cannot do, rather than on what
they can do. Other worthwhile requirements include requiring
traditional practitioners to both refer patients when the practitioner
is unable to effectively manage care and not mislead patients about
the prospects of the treatment working.319
In the United States, the scope of practice of CAM
practitioners is generally set out in specific legislation aimed at
313 In fact, one small survey from Nigeria found that only 9% of people who visited
diviners (one type of traditional practitioner) had complaints of a physical nature. Tola
Olu Pearce, The Assessment of Diviners and their Knowledge by Civil Servants in
SouthWestern Nigeria, 28 SOC. SCI. MED. 917, 921 (1989).
314 Green, supra note 168, at 1128; Maykuth, supra note 164; Sjaak van der Geest,
Is There a Role for Traditional Medicine in Basic Health Services in Africa? A Plea for a
Community Perspective, 2 TROPICAL MED. & INT'L HEALTH 903, 905 (1997) (discussing
how the concept of "medicine" in many African countries is quite broad and
encompasses a multitude of other subject areas which in western culture are not
considered in the medial realm).
315 Green, supra note 168, at 1128; van der Geest, supra note 314, at 905.
316 Maykuth, supra note 164.
317 See generally 0. Ajai, The Integration of Traditional Medicine in the Nigerian
Health Care Delivery System: Legal Implications and Complications, 9 MED. L. 685
(1990) (on the legal implications of trying to integrate traditional medicine into the
Nigerian National Health Care System).
318 Michael H. Cohen, Healing at the Borderland of Medicine and Religion:
Regulating Potential Abuse of Authority by Spiritual Leaders, XVII J.L. & RELIGION
307, 348 (2003).
319 See generally Mehmet Oz, Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Legal
Boundaries and Regulatory Perspectives" by Michael Cohen, 20 J. LEGAL MED. I
(1999) (book review).
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controlling the profession.3 20 Emphasis is in some cases placed on
what practitioners are not allowed to do. For example, in some
states, allied practitioners are expressly prohibited from practicing
medicine.32' Sometimes what constitutes practicing medicine is
defined specifically. For example, a Mississippi law stipulates
that a chiropractor shall not prescribe or administer medicines to
patients or perform surgery.322  The legislation from some
developing countries takes a similar approach. The Nigerian
Medical and Dental Practitioners Act of 1988 allows for
traditional practices, however it prohibits such practitioners from
performing surgery or prescribing drugs.323 Likewise, the Malawi
Medical Practitioners and Dentists Act of 1987 prohibits
traditional practitioners from performing any act which is
dangerous to life.324
One of the greatest harms likely to arise from the use of CAM
or traditional practices is the failure to refer patients when they
suffer from ailments that can readily be treated by conventional
medicine. Regulations aimed at traditional practitioners should
contain provisions dealing with this issue. One approach is to
require traditional practitioners "to refer the patient to a physician
whenever the patient's condition exceeds the scope of their
training, education and competence. '3 25 Legislation in the United
States dealing with CAM providers often contains such
provisions.3 26 An alternate approach, taken by a British Columbia
(Canada) law requires that a practitioner refer a patient when the
patient is not getting better.327 The Vietnamese government also
320 MICHAEL H. COHEN, COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE: LEGAL
BOUNDARIES AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVE 39-55 (1998).
321 Id. at 39.
322 MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-6-1 (2004).
323 WHO (2001), supra note 1, at 39.
324 Id. at 32.
325 47 WHO INT'L DIGEST HEALTH LEGIS. 314 (1996) (discussing Circular No. 8-
BYT/TT of 2 May 1994) (pertaining to the regulation of traditional practitioners in
Vietnam).
326 COHEN, supra note 320, at 412.
327 Health Professionals Act: Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners and
Acupuncturists Regulation, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 183 (Can.).
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takes this approach in regulating traditional practitioners.328 Either
of these may be worthwhile approaches when regulating
traditional practitioners since they are ways of limiting harm
without getting into the tricky business of trying to specify what
traditional practitioners can do. However, the usefulness of the
first of these approaches is contingent on the practitioner being
able to identify treatable medical conditions. Such provisions are
therefore most useful if they are instituted in conjunction with a
program to educate traditional practitioners about some common,
readily treatable, medical conditions.
VII.The Role of Law in Shaping Informal Constraints
If, as suggested, the problem with standards is not
insurmountable, what else can one conclude from the above
discussion? First, any agency established to regulate traditional
practitioners in developing countries is unlikely to discipline many
practitioners. This is, in part, due to the nature of such boards and
also to the fact that the enforcement of regulations in developing
countries is haphazard at best. The governments of most poor
countries simply do not have the resources for adequate
enforcement. Secondly, corruption may undermine the regulatory
process, both in terms of policing and adjudication. Finally, in
many developing countries neither the society in general, nor the
ministry of health in particular, will have a culture that recognizes
the importance of the rule of law. Furthermore, there is reason to
believe that in most developing countries informal sanctions are
the primary form of constraint and that the use of traditional
healers is a deeply engrained norm. But there is reason to believe
the regulation of traditional practitioners is not doomed to failure.
It can be argued that the cynicism expressed in the above
section is unwarranted, as it is based on a faulty premise and a
poor choice of countries to use as a model. The mistaken premise
is that if boards rarely prosecute doctors, then regulation must be
ineffective. Two things suggest that this is not necessarily true.
First, the extent to which a board's effectiveness depends on
prosecution is contingent upon the choice of regulatory
framework. Some regulatory frameworks, such as the American
328 WHO INT'L DIGEST OF HEALTH LEGIS., supra note 325.
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system, seem to depend heavily on prosecution.329 Others, such as
the Canadian system, are less dependent on prosecution.330
American state boards are perhaps somewhat unusual in that their
function appears to be limited to licensing and reviewing
complaints against doctors and, where necessary, taking remedial
action including prosecution.33' Boards in other countries
typically perform a broader range of functions.332 It is perhaps true
that the prospect of an American-style board affecting healthcare
in developing countries is somewhat remote. Prosecution is likely
to be infrequent and even the investigation of individual
complaints may be unlikely. In addition, as Troyen Brennan has
pointed out, there is no evidence that regulation that entails only
''removing a few bad apples" has had any effect in improving the
quality of healthcare, even in the United States.333 The second
point is that even an American-style board might still be useful
because even when prosecution is rare, it can still serve as an
effective deterrent.
Laws do not have to be just about prosecuting the bad. The
regulation of health practitioners can have a broader purpose that
involves correcting market imperfections and shaping norms, self-
imposed standards, and informal constraints. The regulation of
health practitioners in some countries (for example Canada) seem,
at least in part, geared towards this end.334 These are important
functions of regulatory agencies, and functions that are often
neglected when equating the effectiveness of professional
regulation solely with the number of annual prosecutions. A
329 See, e.g., CAL. [BUS & PROF] CODE § 2003-2005 (2005) (defining the purpose
of the California Medical Board); MINN. STAT. § 147.001 (1995) (defining the purpose
of the Minnesota Board of Medical Practice); California Medical Board, Board Role
http://www.medbd.ca.gov/boardrole.htm (stating the purpose of the California Board);
Minnesota Board of Medical Practice, Mission Statement, http://www.state.mn.us/
portal/mn/jsp/content.do?id=-536882533&agency=BMP (follow "General Information"
hyperlink, follow "Mission Statement" hyperlink) (stating the purpose of the Minnesota
Board).
330 See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 329.
332 See infra notes 359, 370-76 and accompanying text.
333 Troyen A. Brennan, The Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement, 76
MILBANK Q. 709, 713 (1998).
334 See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
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consideration of the broader role of regulatory bodies leads back to
the issue of informal constraints.
A. The Role of Government in Shaping Informal Constraints
Informal constraints can be important than formal constraints
in controlling behavior. Given this, it stands to reason that a
potentially effective way for the government to influence behavior
is to try to shape these informal control mechanisms in a socially
desirable direction. Governments have a few ways of doing this.
Undoubtedly education is a key tool in the government's
arsenal.335 By educating consumers about common medical
conditions (malaria, respiratory tract infections, gastroenteritis,
TB, HIV) and their treatment, a government can help to correct
imperfect information. This imperfect information undermines
both a well-functioning market for traditional medicine and the
effective functioning of informal constraints. When the
population realizes that a practitioner erred, it is likely to forgo
future dealings and to spread negative gossip, thereby
undermining the reputation of the practitioner. The practitioner
will then have to either enhance the quality of service or suffer one
of a constellation of adverse outcome including loss of business,
social ostracism, or potential violent retribution. The law is
another weapon that can be used in an attempt to influence
traditional practitioners. In fact, using laws in order to shape
informal constraints may be one of the most effective ways for the
government to regulate. According to North, "third party
enforcement is best realized by creating a set of rules that make a
variety of informal constraints effective." '336
B. Laws Shaping Informal Constraints
Laws can shape informal constraints in a number of ways.
Laws can affect personal mores because most people, at least to
some extent, internalize the duty to obey the law and feel guilty if
they do not.337  But people's willingness to internalize
government-imposed rules is something that likely varies widely
335 See Sunstein, supra note 191, at 961-62.
336 NORTH, supra note 112, at 35.
337 McAdams, supra note 169, at 407.
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from culture to culture.
Laws can also affect norms. A number of mechanisms have
been proposed to explain how this can happen. First, law has an
"expressive function"3 38 by which the law expresses the wishes of
the government. Furthermore, in a democratic society, a law may
signal a consensus 3 9 and symbolize societal values. 34" Another
suggested explanation is that "there is a general norm in favor of
obeying the law., 341  By shaping informal sanctions, laws can
either strengthen or weaken a norm without necessarily providing
any enforcement.34 2 It has been suggested that smoking laws in
the United States are an example of this.343
C. Licensing and Competency
A license provides valuable information to the consumer. The
information costs in determining the true value of the services of a
traditional practitioner are prohibitively high in developing
countries, and therefore people are forced to work with imperfect
information. 3" The lack of information means the free market
does not work well, and people purchase a service that, if fully
informed, they might well choose to forgo. A license serves a
useful purpose in correcting this market imperfection.345 Justice
Field's comments in Dent v. West Virginia346 are as applicable in
338 Sunstein, supra note 191, at 964.
339 McAdams, supra note 169, at 407.
340 Id. at 407.
341 Sunstein, supra note 191, at 958-59.
342 McAdams, supra note 169, at 408; Sunstein, supra note 191, at 958 Please note
this author by no means advocates the enactment of laws which will not be enforced.
The non-enforcement of laws in developing countries contributes significantly to
people's cynicism about the law.
343 McAdams, supra note 169, at 406; Sunstein, supra note 191, at 958; see also
Lessig, supra note 192, at 1025-30 (explaining how the U.S. government managed to
change the social meaning of smoking).
344 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
345 Note that "certification," reserves the right to use a designated title but does not
preclude non-certified individuals from doing the same job (as long as they do not use
the designated title), and it also serves to correct this market imperfection, but without
limiting consumer choice. I will not address the advantages and disadvantages of
certification versus licensing in this paper.
346 See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889).
2006]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
today's developing world as they were over a century ago in the
United States.
D. Self-regulation as a Way of Encouraging Desirable Norms
For some countries, encouraging or forcing traditional
practitioners to organize and practice some degree of self-
regulation seems a worthwhile way to improve the quality of
traditional medicine. This is because, irrespective of whatever
else such organizations do, the organizations become a vehicle for
encouraging the development of desirable norms. This approach
is particularly attractive because experience with networks
suggests that they may work even in places where the rule of law
is weak.3
47
Associations of traditional practitioners may form their own
organizations just as medical professional associations initially
did. It should be noted, however, that the organizations that have
arisen spontaneously as a means of private ordering 348 have
offered more material benefits to their members than we can
reasonably expect an association of traditional practitioners to
provide. Furthermore, associations such as the American Medical
Association (AMA), which has played a key role in developing
professional ethics and standards, have evolved over a long period
of time.3 49 Governments may not want to wait for such groups to
organize on their own. The state may therefore want to intervene
in order to encourage traditional practitioners to organize.
There are a number of approaches that the state can use in
order to promote the organization of traditional practitioners. One
approach is to make membership in a professional college
mandatory.350 Alternatively, the government could threaten to
347 See supra Part V.D.
348 See supra text accompanying notes 199-209.
349 The AMA was founded in 1847. See American Medical Association, AMA
History, http://www.ama-assn.org/ (follow "about AMA" hyperlink, then follow "AMA
history" hyperlink).
350 In Canada provincial colleges license physicians. Once licensed, physicians
become members of the college. See, e.g., Medical Practitioners Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch.
285. Section 81 makes it an offence to practice medicine without being registered under
the Act. Section 4 states that members of the college (College of Physicians and
Surgeons of British Columbia) are those persons that are registered under the Act. See id.
See also Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons,
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impose regulations if self-regulation proves ineffective.35'
Once practitioners form a group, it is perhaps inevitable that
norms will develop. However, as such norms may not necessarily
be socially desirable,35 2 it may be in the government's interest to
try to mold them in the right direction. Self-regulation can range
from informal, non-binding arrangements, to rules of full legal
force.353 Ayers and Braithwaite have suggested that governments
use a pyramid strategy with respect to regulation.354 Only where
voluntary self-regulation does not bring about the desired results is
punishment-first discretionary and later mandatory-used to
bring about the desired results.355 Examples of differing levels of
government involvement in the self-regulatory process are evident
when comparing the American and Canadian approaches to
regulating the medical profession. In the United States, the
development of codes of ethics, standards, and guidelines has
largely been left to the AMA and specialty academies,356 which are
not-for-profit corporations.357  In Canada, although specialist
associations are involved in performing these functions,358 these
http://www.cpso.on.ca/About-the_College/thecollege.htm (follow link to "General
college information").
351 Katz, supra note 209, at 2491.
352 Wendel, supra note 132, at 1953.
353 BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 97, at 126.
354 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION-TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 35 (1992).
355 See BALDWIN & CAVE, supra note 97, at 41 (writing with respect to a graduated
approach to self regulation); see also AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 354, at 35;
KEITH HAWKINS, LAW AS A LAST RESORT: A READER ON REGULATION 292 (1998).
356 See American Medical Association, Ethics Group, http://www.ama-assn.org/
(follow "Professional Resources" hyperlink, then follow "Medical Ethics" hyperlink then
follow "Ethics Group" hyperlink). See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics,
homepage, http://www.aap.org (providing links for practice guidelines for pediatricians).
357 See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, AAP Fact Sheet, http://www.aap.org/
(follow "About AAP" hyperlink, and then "Fact Sheet" hyperlink); American College of
Obstetricians and Surgeons, ACOG Governance Structure, http://www.acog.org / (follow
"about us" hyperlink, then "about ACOG" hyperlink, then to "ACOG Governance
Structure" hyperlink).
358 There are also individual specialty associations which specialists can voluntarily
become member of, and which frequently publish sets of clinical guidelines. See, e.g.,
The Society of.Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada, Clinical Practice Guidelines,
http://sogc.medical.org/ (follow "Clinical Guidelines" hyperlink) (listing practice
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functions also fall within the mandate of provincial colleges35 9
which are statutory bodies.36 °
Even without any organized form of self-regulation,
governments can hold workshops for practitioners or establish
training facilities in an attempt to influence norms within
professional organizations. However, in the Canadian model,
once a board or other regulatory body is formed, the responsibility
is largely transferred to the board.3 6' The enabling legislation that
establishes such boards or colleges normally sets out the board's
duties and responsibilities. These duties often amount to a duty to
promote the development of socially desirable professional norms
and standards. For example, the Ontario Health Professions
Procedural Code3 62 section 3(1) lists the following as objects of
each college:
3. To develop, establish and maintain programs and standards of
practice to assure the quality of the practice of the profession.
4. To develop, establish and maintain standards of knowledge
and skill and programs to promote continuing competence
among the members.363
guidelines for those doing obstetrics and gynecology); Canadian Anesthesiologists
Society, Guidelines, http://www.cas.ca/ (follow "Guidelines" hyperlink) (stating practice
guidelines for anesthetists)
359 See infra notes 362-65 and accompanying text. See, e.g., College of Physicians
and Surgeons of British Columbia, Clinical Guidelines Protocol, https://
www.cpsbc.ca/cps (follow "Physician Resources" hyperlink,, then follow "Physician
Education" hyperlink, then follow "Clinical Practice Guidelines and Protocols"
hyperlink) (listing practice guidelines as well as a Code of Conduct for British Columbia
physicians); College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, Policy and Publications,
http://www.cpso.on.ca/default.htm (follow "Policies" hyperlink) (listing clinical and
ethical guidelines).
360 Keith W. Brownell & Luc C6td, Senior Residents' Views on the Meaning of
Professionalism and How They Learn about It, 76 ACAD. MED. 734 (2001).
361 See infra notes 362-65 and accompanying text.
362 Regulated Health Professions Act R.S.O. 1991, ch. 18, Schedule 2 (Can.).
Pursuant to § 4 of the Regulated Health Professions Act, R.S.O. 1991, ch. 18 (Can.), the
Code is deemed to be part of each of the provinces health profession Acts.
363 As an example of how a college can try to affect conduct without actually
prosecuting, consider how the Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons tries to
promote continuing education when in Manitoba there is no formal requirement that
doctors participate in CME. The College's Code of Conduct includes a requirement to
"engage in lifelong learning to maintain and improve your professional knowledge,
skills, and attitudes." Manitoba College of Physicians and Surgeons Bylaw Number 1,
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5. To develop, establish and maintain standards of professional
ethics for the members.364
Just as voluntary associations will not necessarily develop socially
desirable norms, mandatory boards can also go astray.
Governments can ensure that the development of standards and
ethics are in accordance with the needs of the population by
maintaining some control of the board. Legislation aimed at
health practitioners, including traditional practitioners, often gives
the government such control. For example, pursuant to the new
South African Act, the Minister of Health appoints members to the
Traditional Health Practitioners Council.365  In Singapore the
Minister of Health determines who sits on the Traditional Chinese
Medicine Practitioners Board.3 66 Similarly the Indian Government
also has significant control over who sits on the Central Council of
Indian Medicine.367
The threat of more extensive government involvement also
helps to ensure that boards evolve in a direction which furthers the
public interest. Self-regulation may be a result of a bargain
between the state and the profession. As long as the profession
continues to act in the public's best interest, the profession is
allowed to self-regulate.3 68  The Merrison Report in England
recommended a predominantly professional General Medical
Council but added, "[t]he ultimate safeguard of the public interest
is the power of Parliament. ... Parliament will be able to
intervene if the contract to which we have referred is not operating
Code of Conduct, art. 5. The college admonishes members that "we have a
responsibility to keep up with advances in our discipline and to be accountable." 39
CPSM Newsletter (2003). A college bylaw also requires that, as part of the annual
membership review, members declare whether they have participated in CME in the last
year. The same by-law also instructs members that they should keep a record of all
CME credits for the two years prior to the declaration. Manitoba College of Physicians
and Surgeons Bylaw Number 1.
364 See also, e.g., Medical Practitioners Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, ch. 285, § 3 (listing the
objects and duties of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia).
365 Traditional Practitioners Act 35 of 2004, § 7 (S. Afr.).
366 Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Act, No. 34 of 2000, ch. 333A, § 3
(Sing.).
367 Indian Medicine Central Council Act, No. 48 of 1970; India Code (1970), ch. 2,
§ 3.
368 JACOB, supra note 174, at 134.
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in the general public interest."369
Legislation that promotes self-regulation and involves the
government in the ongoing process of developing socially
desirable norms might be a useful way to try to improve the
quality of traditional medicine. It seems evident that many
countries seem to have taken this broader regulatory approach.
For example, the South African parliament recently passed the
Traditional Health Practitioners Act,37° which established a
Traditional Health Practitioners Council.371 Some of the objects
and functions of the Council are to: "ensure the quality of health
services within the traditional health practice; ... promote and
maintain appropriate ethical and professional standards required
from traditional health practitioners; [] promote and develop
interest in traditional health practice by encouraging research,
education and training.. . ."372 Other jurisdictions that have used
this approach include Singapore,3 73  Hong Kong,374  and
Zimbabwe.375
E. Achieving Compliance Without Prosecution
Though medical boards in developed countries have rarely
prosecuted and there are gross inefficiencies in rule enforcement
in developing countries, establishing and enforcing conventional
regulations for health practitioners in developing countries is not
necessarily futile. Compliance may be achieved through the use
of informal mechanisms and by de-emphasizing prosecution. A
regulatory approach based on education, advice, persuasion, and
negotiation, rather than prosecution, is known as a compliance
369 Id. at 135.
370 Traditional Health Practitioners Act 35 of 2004 (S. Afr.).
371 Id.
372 Id. § 5.
373 See Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Act, No. 34 of 2000, ch. 333A,
§ 3 (Sing.).
374 See Chinese Medicine Ordinance (1999) Cap. 549. (H.K.)
375 Traditional Medical Practitioners Act of 1981 tit. 27 ch. 14. (Zimb.). The
Zimbabwe law established a Traditional Medical Practitioners Council whose task is to
"supervise and control the practice of traditional medical practitioners" and "to promote
the practice of traditional medical practitioners". See id.
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approach.376 This contrasts with the deterrence approach which
emphasizes prosecution.
Regulatory approaches vary between countries. Baldwin has
suggested that, in general, the compliance-based approach is more
the English approach and the deterrence model, based on
prosecution, is more typically an adversarial American
approach.377 The compliance model, which is less transparent and
more informal, is perhaps internationally more the norm.378
Baldwin cites Japan as another example of a country that has an
informal regulatory style.3 79  Authorities there exercise wide
discretion and compliance is largely voluntary.
3 80
In Britain, agencies often adopt a position that legislative
purposes can best be furthered by the extensive "(formal) non-
enforcement of specific offences. '381 Prosecution is a symbolic
act, "the dramatization of the moral notions of the community.',
382
The regulator may seek to prosecute occasionally just to show that
"something is being done. 383
F. The Shadow of the Law
A number of authors have suggested that informal constraints
work better "in the shadow of the law."' '84 Even the rare
prosecution of the odd itinerant practitioner may be enough to cast
a useful shadow. The fact that medical boards in developing
countries rarely punish doctors does not necessarily mean that the
threat of prosecution holds no deterrence value. The threat of
malpractice litigation in developing countries is also very remote
and yet the doctors in the hospitals where this author worked in
Swaziland, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu all staunchly held the
376 BALDWIN ET AL., supra note 97.
377 Id. at 22 (addressing regulation in general, rather than regulation of the medical
profession).
378 Id.
379 Id. (citing H. BAUM, INTRODUCTION: EMULATING JAPAN? (1997)).
380 Id.
381 HAWKINS, supra note 355, at 292.
382 Id. at 291.
383 Id. at 292
384 Aviram, supra note 133, at 1191.
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belief that if you were to make a major mistake, particularly a
surgical mistake, you had a good chance of being sued. Had it
been pointed out to these doctors that the evidence showed that
medical mistakes rarely give rise to law suits, even in a
comparatively highly litigious society like the United States,385 and
that the chances of being sued in their country were even more
remote, what would have been their reaction? They would likely
still have been resistant to absorbing information that was
inconsistent with their folklore386  when their folkloric beliefs
about the law were questioned.
Doctors in the countries, including Swaziland, Papua New
Guinea, and Vanuatu, where this author worked, appear to
overestimate the chance of being prosecuted. Doctors in India
also seem prone to doing the same. A survey of doctors in that
country showed that the Consumer Protection Act succeeded in
changing the way medicine was practiced.387 This occurred
despite the fact that comparatively few doctors are actually sued
pursuant to the legislation.388 For example, 58% of respondents
felt that, because of the Act, doctors spent more time with their
patients.3 89  Sixty-three percent of respondents believed that the
Act had led to an increase in information sharing.3 90 Finally, 91%
believed that it had led to an increased cost and the use of
385 See A.R. Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245 (1991); see also PATRICIA M.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 18-19 (1985)
(concluding that medical malpractice litigation infrequently compensates patients injured
by medical negligence).
386 See ELLICKSON, supra note 124, at 115 (for a comparable reaction by the
cattlemen he studied in Shasta County, CA). According to Ellickson, "cattlemen
repeatedly get reports that insurance companies and courts have not followed the adage
that 'the motorist buys a cow in open range.' The cattlemen treat the receipt of these
reports not as occasion for updating their beliefs about the law but rather as occasions for
railing about the incompetence of courts and insurance companies." Id.
387 Bhat, supra note 63, at 266-67.
388 Data from Andhra Pradesh shows that between 1995 and 2002, on average 16.75
cases per year come before the AP State forum, with an estimated 15-25 more appearing
before the district forums. See George, supra note 278, at 24-25. In 1991 there were
32,931 doctors registered with medical councils in Andhra Pradesh. See Bhat, supra
note 63, at 258.
389 B hat, supra note 63, at 266-67
390 Id.
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39'diagnostics.
What holds for tort law may also hold true for regulation. It
might not matter much that medical boards prosecute infrequently.
A few highly publicized prosecutions may have a significant
impact on perceived risk. Some governments are quite adept at
manipulating the media so as to deceive people into thinking that
their chances of being caught are much higher than they actually
are.
G. Regulations May Change Societal Norms Favoring the
Use of Traditional Practitioners
In many societies, when people get sick they go first to a
traditional practitioner. It is the norm. By requiring that such
practitioners be licensed, that the practitioners must refer patients
that they can not effectively treat, and by occasionally prosecuting
those who commit egregious wrongs, regulations may help to
change societal norms. Perhaps it will lead people to question
whether treatment by traditional practitioners is always in their
best interest.
VIII.Conclusion
There is little empirical evidence as to whether regulating
traditional practitioners is an effective way of improving quality of
care. Given the history of comparable regulatory agencies in
developed countries, and the difficulties in enforcing laws in
developing countries, there is reason to believe that agencies
established to regulate traditional practitioners in developing
countries are unlikely to discipline many practitioners. This does
not mean that regulation cannot serve a useful purpose.
Regulation is not only about disciplining the occasional bad apple.
The regulation of health practitioners can have a broader purpose
that involves correcting market imperfections, shaping norms,
self-imposed standards, and informal constraints.
In every culture there are informal constraints that exist
alongside the formal constraints. These informal constraints are as
important, if not more, in determining the quality of healthcare.
Part of the function of regulation should be to recognize the
391 Id.
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existence of these informal mechanisms and to attempt to both
encourage such constraints and to mold them in a socially
desirable direction.
Whether regulations will be effective in the way described is
admittedly a matter of conjecture. Although this kind of
regulatory approach is not as dependent on a functioning
enforcement agency as is the rigid enforcement of standards
through prosecution, it still requires resources. For example,
someone needs to issue licenses, and although a licensing fee may
make the process more attractive, lack of manpower may still be a
factor. The licensing process also presents an opportunity for
corruption and this too may compromise the regulatory initiative.
Encouraging norms by forming boards, educating practitioners and
promulgating codes of conduct also takes resources.392 Similarly,
although the occasional well-publicized prosecution may have
deterrent value this means that the regulatory process, at least
occasionally, must work and that there must be some form of
media to spread word of that fact. The expressive function of the
law is also dependent on the law being publicized.
Although the value of regulation is not clear, it is perhaps not
quite so doomed to failure as some would believe. The chances of
such laws resulting in a radical change in practice seem highly
unlikely. However, according to North, the single most important
point about institutional change is that such change is
overwhelmingly incremental.3 93  Laws regulating traditional
practitioners may well contribute to an incremental change in the
way traditional medicine is practiced.
392 Bishaw, supra note 307, at 197. In Ethiopia, for example, the Ministry of Health
organized traditional healers into professional associations but the Ministry did not have
the funds, personnel, or perhaps interest to continue to promote the idea and as a result
many of these organizations disbanded. Id.
393 NORTH, supra note 112, at 89; NORTH, supra note 133, at 23.
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